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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation addresses three policy-relevant issues using experimental 
methodology. These studies illustrate the value of using experimental methods to study 
policy questions. 
First is the blood donation game, which is related to health policy. In this essay I 
design an experiment to investigate two incentive treatments intended to increase 
donations, a waiver of blood transfusion fees and priority access to blood supplies. I find 
that both the waiver treatment and the priority treatment significantly raise donations, 
and combining the two incentives has the most impact. Second, I study private provision 
of public goods and examine how introducing the possibility that group members can 
punish each other affects provision, varying group sizes. Results indicate that 
introducing a punishment institution has no effect when group size is small. However, 
for large groups, introducing the punishment institution dramatically increases provision. 
Finally, I use a popular contest game, the non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game, to 
study economic policy. This game mimics the R&D investment decisions of companies 
that compete with each other. I investigate two factors that might make it easier for firms 
to engage in a kind of tacit collusion, collectively lowering their investment in 
innovation: the stability of the relationship (pairs are either stable over time or re-
matched each round), and the number of prizes (which proxy for inventions). I conclude 
that subjects are more successful in tacitly colluding when groups are stable, regardless 
of the number of prizes. However, when randomly re-matched every period, subjects 
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only collude when there are more prizes: that is, having more prizes facilitates tacit 
collusion. Both players are worse off when the number of prizes is small because they 
increase their bids to compete more aggressively against each other. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The three studies that comprise this dissertation use laboratory experiments to 
address three different public policy issues in the areas of health, social and economic 
policy. 
The first study, contained in Section 2, focuses on health policy. The need for 
blood is increasing every year in many countries, according to the World Health 
Organization (WHO). A number of approaches have been taken to elicit more blood 
donations. Some institutions waive blood transfusion fees for recipients who have 
donated in the past. Others give priority access to former donors when the demand for 
blood exceeds supply. In this study, I design a new lab experiment to investigate the 
extent to which these two incentive treatments, a waiver of blood transfusion fees and 
priority access to blood supplies, are effective in increasing donations. I find that 
donations increase the most when subjects are exposed to the combination of both 
waiver and priority incentives. Both the waiver treatment and priority treatment 
individually increase contributions; however, the waiver treatment is more successful at 
increasing donations than the priority treatment. 
Section 3 investigates social policy in the context of the private provision of 
public goods. The public goods game has been one of the most influential games applied 
to the study of social welfare. In this game each subject is given an endowment of 
resources which can be divided between their own earnings and a good that benefits 
their group: the public good. Introducing a punishment institution – that is, the 
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possibility that group members can punish one another – has been shown to be effective 
at increasing public good contributions. I examine the effectiveness of punishment for 
groups of different sizes.  One might expect that a punishment institution would have the 
most impact on small groups, because of a second-order free rider problem: group 
members might free ride on the punishment effort of others, and this would worsen with 
group size. However, I find that punishment has no effect on contribution levels when 
the group size is very small (2). However, for large groups (8 or 24), the provision of the 
public good is dramatically increased when punishment is introduced, and the 
cooperation that results can also be sustained. 
Section 4 studies economic policy with respect to firm R&D investment. 
Suppose that firms compete to develop an innovation contest, and the firm that invests 
the most is more likely to be successful. To mimic this situation, I investigate people’s 
behavior in a contest environment, the Colonel Blotto game. In this game, two players 
simultaneously allocate their endowments across multiple prizes (or inventions). The 
goal of each player is to maximize profit by using the minimum amount of resources to 
win the most prizes. Firms are better off if they can tacitly agree to reduce spending, 
because even if spending is very low, one firm will still win the contest.  I vary two 
factors that might make it easier for firms to engage in tacit collusion, collectively 
lowering their investment in innovation: the stability of the relationship (pairs are either 
stable over time or re-matched each round), and the number of prizes (which proxy for 
inventions). Results show that subjects always succeed in reducing investment when 
groups are stable, regardless of the number of prizes. However, when firms are re-
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matched each period, firms only succeed in reducing spending when there is a large 
number of prizes. When the number of prizes is small, firms increase their bids to 
compete more aggressively against each other. Thus, both are worse off. 
These three sections address different policy-relevant issues and suggest 
solutions to practical problems for policy makers to enhance efficiency and economic 
welfare. 
 
 
 
 
  
4 
2. HELP FOR THE HELPER: CAN BLOOD DONOR INSURANCE PLANS INSPIRE
GREATER GIVING 
2.1 Introduction 
The need for blood and blood products is increasing every year all over the 
world. The critical shortage of blood is one of the biggest social issues worldwide. Blood 
banks in the U.S. face seasonal blood shortages. Especially in 2015, both the Red Cross 
and America’s Blood Centers, which together represent virtually all U.S. blood banks, 
reported severe shortages during early fall when blood supplies are usually adequate.1 
Compared to the U.S., the availability of blood in developing countries is even scarcer. 
These blood shortage situations can be improved only if we maintain adequate supplies 
of blood.  
The American Red Cross reports that an estimated 38% of the U.S. population is 
eligible to donate blood, but less than 10% actually do each year.2 According to WHO 
Global Database on Blood Safety for the year 2012, the median blood donation rate is 
36.8 donations per 1000 individuals in high-income countries, 11.7 donations in middle-
income countries and just 3.9 donations in low-income countries.3 Thus, the top priority 
of blood banks is to encourage individuals to donate blood in an effective way. WHO 
has adopted a resolution encouraging countries to promote the development of national 
1 Abc News on September 19, 2015 (http://abcnews.go.com/Health/story?id=117954) 
2  Blood Facts and Statistics from American Red Cross (http://www.redcrossblood.org/learn-
about-blood/blood-facts-and-statistics) 
3 Blood Safety and Availability from WHO (http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs279/en/) 
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blood services based on voluntary donations since 1975. However, purely altruistic 
incentives are not always enough to collect sufficient donations to fulfill the blood 
demand. There are still a few countries, like Russia, that have to pay blood donors to 
maintain an adequate supply. Although blood donation remains primarily voluntary in 
the developed world, different incentives have been offered to raise donations.  
In the U.S., the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires that rewards for 
unpaid blood donors not be easily convertible to cash; however, the line between paying 
cash and offering monetary incentives is often a fine one. Most American blood banks 
recruit donors by using different forms of rewards including t-shirts, umbrellas, event 
tickets, or drawings for expensive prizes such as cars or home appliances. European 
countries, such as Italy and Germany, also offer similar incentives for blood donors. 
These incentives range from one or more days off work and tax reliefs to other material 
rewards.  
Quite a few blood banks in the U.S. have recently started to offer insurance-like 
donor benefits to their donors. Blood centers, such as Our Lady of the Lake4 and the 
Mayo Clinic5, offer donors different insurance plans. Blood donors are rewarded with a 
supplement to their existing insurance that helps cover the charges for any blood they 
4 Our Lady of the Lake offers blood donors assurance plans. Through these plans, blood donors 
are rewarded by providing a supplement to existing insurance that helps cover the charges for blood use. 
The plans include unlimited replacement coverage for specific individuals on a yearly time frame and 
coverage for blood used at any hospital in the country. (https://fmolhs.org/ololrmc/Pages/Give-
Support/Blood-Donor-Center/Benefits-of-Blood-Donation.aspx) 
5 Mayo Clinic offers donors the Recipient Benefits Plan which is designed to provide limited 
financial assistance to blood donors, their immediate families or specific designees who have received 
blood transfusions. It helps these recipients recover some of the blood processing fees. 
(http://www.mayoclinic.org/patient-visitor-guide/florida/blood-donor-program/recipient-benefits-program) 
6 
may use at any hospital in the country. These donor insurance plans have closely 
mimicked the blood donor benefit policies which have been in place in some Asian 
countries for decades. In China and Korea, people with prior donations are granted 
preferential treatments when they need to receive blood transfusions in the future. People 
who donated blood before might be exempted from blood transfusion fees, or even get 
priority during blood shortages. In Hunan province in China, donors who give a 
minimum of 900 mL of blood are guaranteed unlimited free use of blood for their 
lifetimes; those who give between 600 mL and 900 mL can receive three times the 
amount donated; those who give less than 600 mL can receive twice the amount. 
Spouses, parents and children of blood donors are also granted free use of blood up to 
the amount donated.6  
Although most people are aware of the small rewards that are sometimes given to 
blood donors, they might not be aware that they could automatically be enrolled in 
blood-donor insurance plans and enjoy benefits if they need to receive blood 
transfusions in the future. In this paper, I design an experiment that captures all the key 
features of the process of making the decision to donate blood.  Within this experimental 
environment I test the impact of two different insurance-related incentives for donating: 
waiving the fee for donors for future units of blood purchased, and giving priority to 
donors for future blood needs. Results show that, while compared to the no-incentive 
baseline, both incentives increase donations, the difference is statistically significant for 
6  This regulation was announced by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on 
September 30, 2006 in Hunan Province of China.  
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the waiver incentive and is only marginally significant for the priority incentive. But 
when these two incentives are combined, donations increase the most.   
2.2 Previous Literature 
Currently, a limited amount of research has investigated common gift-exchange 
rewarding mechanisms in charitable giving. Researchers choose different reward medias 
to incentivize people to donate blood. However, a conflict of opinions arises over the 
matter. Lacetera et al. (2012) conduct a field experiment involving nearly 14,000 
American Red Cross blood drives and show that economic incentives have a positive 
effect on blood donations without attracting ineligible donors. The effect increases with 
the incentive's economic value. However, a substantial proportion of the increase in 
donations is explained by donors leaving neighboring drives without incentives to attend 
drives with incentives; this displacement can also increase with the economic value of 
the incentive. They conclude that extrinsic incentives stimulate prosocial behavior, but 
the effect may be overestimated if displacement effects are not considered. Furse and 
Stewart (1982) conduct another field experiment, in which both a monetary incentive 
and a charity incentive (a promised contribution) are given for responses to a mail 
survey. This experiment includes three treatments: a no-incentive control, a personal 
cash payments treatment and a promised contribution to a charity treatment. They find 
that the charity incentive does not produce a significantly greater survey return rate than 
was obtained with the no-incentive control. However, personal cash incentives produce a 
significantly greater response rate than either the no-incentive baseline condition or the 
charity-incentive condition. 
8 
Other studies provide contradictory opinions on the effect of common gift-
exchange incentives. Titmuss (1971) argues that monetary compensation for donating 
blood might crowd out the supply of blood donors. To test this claim, Mellström and 
Johannesson (2008) carry out a field experiment with three different treatments. In the 
first treatment, subjects are given the opportunity to become blood donors without any 
compensation. In the second treatment, subjects receive a payment of $7 for becoming 
blood donors, and in the third treatment, subjects choose between a $7 payment and 
donating $7 to charity. The results differ markedly between men and women. For men, 
the supply of blood donors is not significantly different among the three experimental 
groups. For women, there is a significant crowding-out effect. The supply of blood 
donors decreases by almost half when a monetary payment is introduced. There is also a 
significant effect of allowing individuals to donate the payment to charity, and this effect 
fully counteracts the crowding-out effect. Existing literature also includes Heyman and 
Ariely (2004), and Kube et al. (2012) and provides evidence that cash payments appear 
to be ineffective or even counter-productive in stimulating extra effort. Similarly, 
Newman and Shen (2012) conduct six experiments to examine the effect of thank-you 
gifts on charitable giving. They found that thank-you gifts actually reduce charitable 
donations.  
Lacetera and Macis (2010) argue that a number of experimental studies have 
documented that financial rewards undermine the performance of charitable activities. 
They conduct an experiment through a survey administered to 467 blood donors in an 
Italian town. They vary incentives by providing donors with either 10 euros in cash or 
9 
vouchers for purchasing some goods of the same nominal value. They find that donors 
are not reluctant to receive compensation. Although a large number of donors stop 
donating if they are given the cash, such effects disappear when donors are offered 
vouchers. Women especially dislike direct cash payments.  
Non-financial incentives have been investigated in several studies. Reich et al. 
(2006) conduct a field experiment in which t-shirts were offered to blood donors as a 
blood donor recruiting strategy. Authors conclude that a t-shirt incentive is not effective, 
which suggests that other common nonmonetary incentives may be less effective than 
expected. Glynn et al. (2003) conduct a survey asking previous blood donors about what 
type of incentives would encourage them to donate more. They find that the incentives 
that are related to health are chosen the most. Goette and Stutzer (2008) examine two 
types of incentives: a lottery ticket from the Swill State Lottery and a free cholesterol 
test. They conclude that lottery tickets significantly increase donations, especially among 
less motivated donors. However, the cholesterol test leads to no significant impact on 
usable blood donations.   
Kessler and Roth (2012) investigate a special incentive in organ donations: donor 
priority. They design a laboratory experiment modeled on the decision to register as an 
organ donor and investigate how changes in the management of organ waiting lists 
might impact donations. They find that an organ allocation policy giving priority on 
waiting lists to those who previously registered as donors has a significant positive 
impact on registration.  
10 
This paper is similar to the previously mentioned studies, in that I also 
investigate incentives to donate. However, this paper is the first, to my knowledge, that 
uses donor insurance benefits as incentives to increase blood donations. The intuitions 
behind the insurance-like incentives in organ and blood donations are similar. However, 
it differs from the organ donation paper due to the essential distinctions between 
donating organs and donating blood. The supply and demand of transplanted organs is 
extremely unbalanced. Offering priority when the donor needs organ transplantations 
could be an adequate incentive to encourage registration. In the case of blood donations, 
the demand and supply is moderately unbalanced. Different from organ donations, there 
are fewer constraints in blood donations. People not only decide whether they want to 
donate or not, but also how often they want to donate. The priority incentive may not be 
sufficient to encourage people to donate blood. To fill the gap between using the 
insurance-like incentives in organ and blood donations, our paper will investigate the 
impacts of different blood-donor insurance incentives using experimental methods. If the 
impact of these insurance-like incentives are tested to be effective, policy makers may 
consider widely encouraging blood banks to adopt these mechanisms and highlighting 
these benefits in blood donor recruiting advertisement.  
2.3 Experimental Design 
I design four experimental treatments (including the baseline) to model different 
blood-donor benefit mechanisms. Instructions to subjects are stated in neutral language 
(i.e., not in terms of blood donation) to focus on the effect of the incentives. The 
experiment includes three phases, and is designed to capture key aspects of the decision 
11 
to donate blood. In some countries, people donate blood and enroll in donor insurance 
programs automatically. Everyone faces the risk of losing blood. Donors can enjoy 
preferential treatments if they need blood in the future. However, they don’t know 
whether they will need the blood or not before making their decisions. In my 
experiment, subjects decide whether to donate a “unit” to a group account, which can be 
thought of as a blood bank, in the first phase. In the second phase, subjects participate in 
a lottery, and the results determine which subjects need to purchase a unit. This phase 
mimics the process by which individuals come to need blood. Losers in the lottery are 
like those who become ill or experience an accident, and therefore require a unit of 
blood. In the third phase of the experiment, subjects decide whether to purchase a unit 
from the group account. Depending on the treatment, prior donors will receive benefits 
in this phase, as explained below. Health status carries over from period to period. If a 
subject who needs a unit fails to obtain one, he/she is then unable to donate in the next 
period. Subjects who are not healthy enough to donate generate a new unit between 
periods, which is then available for donation. Earnings are determined by health status at 
the end of each period, taking into account the cost (if any) of obtaining a unit.   
Thus, subjects make three decisions in each period. First, each eligible subject is 
asked to make a donation decision of whether to donate one unit from the private 
account to the group account (Phase 1). Second, each subject plays a lottery game, in 
which the chance of winning is 1/2 and the chance of losing is 1/2 (Phase 2). Third, 
losers in the lottery game have a chance to purchase one unit from the group account 
(Phase 3).  
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At the beginning of each treatment, subjects are randomly assigned into groups 
of six. The composition of the groups remains the same throughout the treatment. Each 
group begins with an empty shared group account, and each subject receives a private 
account containing 2 units and 30 tokens. The number of units in the private account 
indicates a person’s health condition in terms of being eligible to donate and being in 
need of blood (see Table 1). Two units indicate the person is very healthy and eligible to 
donate blood. One unit indicates that the person is just doing alright; there is no need to 
receive a blood transfusion, but he/she is not eligible to donate blood either. Zero units 
indicate that the person needs to receive a blood transfusion.  
In Phase 1, subjects who are currently holding two units in their private accounts 
will be asked whether they would like to donate one unit to the group account. To play 
the lottery game in Phase 2, each subject needs to select a number from 1 through 6, and 
then the computer will randomly generate 3 numbers, also from 1 through 6. If the 
subject-chosen number is one of the computer-chosen numbers, the subject will win the 
game; otherwise the subject will lose. A winner in the lottery game is able to retain units 
currently held in his/her private account. In other words, a winner doesn’t lose anything. 
On the other hand, a loser will lose all the units currently held in the private account. 
Phase 1 and Phase 2 are the same across all the treatments. 
 
Table 1: Unites and Health Conditions  
 
Units 2 1 0 
Eligible to Donate Yes No No 
Need Blood  No No Yes 
13 
      In Phase 3, losers may request to purchase one unit from the group account. If 
received, the unit is deposited into the private account and a 30-token fee may be 
charged. Differences across treatments arise in this phase:  
Treatment 1: Baseline. Units in the group account are randomly assigned among 
unit-requesting losers, and losers who receive a unit pay a 30-token fee;  
Treatment 2: Waiver. Units in the group account are still randomly allocated 
among losers. However, losers who made a donation in Phase 1 will receive a unit for 
free and losers who didn’t make the donation need to pay a 30-token fee; 
Treatment 3: Priority. Losers who donated in Phase 1 receive one unit from the 
group account with certainty. Then the remaining units in the group account will be 
randomly allocated among the rest of the losers who did not donate in Phase 1. Any 
subject who successfully purchases one unit needs to pay 30 tokens; 
Treatment 4: Wavier & Priority. Losers who donated in Phase 1 will not only 
receive one unit from the group account with certainty, but will also get it for free. Then 
the remaining units in the group account will be randomly allocated among losers who 
did not donate in Phase 1 and a 30-token fee will also be charged.        
Each treatment consists of 6 periods. At the end of each period (after Phase 3), 
subjects will receive corresponding payoffs based on how many units they are holding in 
their private accounts (shown in Table 2). Token payoffs cumulate across periods, and 
units in the private account (health status) carry over from period to period, but not from 
game to game. Since blood expires, units in the group account do not carry over to the 
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next period in the game. To reflect the ability to replenish blood, subjects who have 
fewer than two units at the end of a period receive one bonus unit to start the next period. 
 
 
 
Each subject participates in two treatments, a baseline always followed by either 
another baseline or an incentive treatment. We call the first treatment (first 6 periods of 
the experiment) Game1 and the second treatment (last 6 periods of the experiment) 
Game 2. There are 4 different types of combinations of Game 1 and Game 2: a baseline 
followed by a baseline, a baseline followed by a waiver treatment, a baseline followed 
by a priority treatment and a baseline followed by a waiver & priority treatment. This 
order imitates the fact that, in a typical policy implementation, an incentive is adopted to 
improve the current performance of an institution. The composition of groups is different 
in the second game from the first game. Subjects are assigned to a new group before 
starting the second game. At the end of the experiment, one of the two games is 
randomly chosen for the payment. 
2.4 Theoretical Predictions 
2.4.1 Nash Equilibria 
Rational people maximize their payoffs. The payoff function in the this game is 
as follows, 
Table 2: Period Payoffs  
 
Number of Units 2 1 0 
Tokens Payoffs 125 100 0 
15 
𝐸𝜋 = 𝑝𝑤𝑖𝑛 ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑛 + 𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒, 
where 𝑝𝑤𝑖𝑛  and 𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒  indicate the probabilities of winning and losing respectively. 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑛  and 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒  present the payoffs received as a winner or a loser 
respectively. In order to simplify the game, I only consider the case in which all six 
group members are eligible to donate. Therefore, each group has seven possible cases: 
all six group members keep the unit; five people keep it and only one person donates; 
four people keep it and two people donate; three people keep it and three people donate; 
two people keep it and four people donate; one person keeps it and five people donate; 
and all six group members donate. For each treatment, I calculate each case scenario’s 
payoffs from either keeping or donating (see Table 3, 4, 5 and 6).  
At a Nash equilibrium, no player can gain more by changing his/her own 
strategy. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium for the baseline is “everyone keeps”; for the 
waiver treatment it is “everyone donates”; for the priority treatment it is “three people 
donate and three people keep”; and for the waiver & priority treatment it is “everyone 
donates.”  
Table 3: Payoffs – Baseline 
Cases Payoffs from Keeping Payoffs from Donating 
6 people keep 62.5 NA 
5 people keep, 1 person donates 73.98 61.48 
4 people keep, 2 people donate 84.38 71.88 
3 people keep, 3 people donate 92.03 79.53 
2 people keep, 4 people donate 96.04 83.54 
1 person keeps, 5 people donate 97.32 88.46 
6 people donate NA 85 
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Table 4: Payoffs – Waiver Treatment  
Cases Payoffs from Keeping Payoffs from Donating 
6 people keep 62.5 NA 
5 people keep, 1 person donates 73.98 66.41 
4 people keep, 2 people donate 84.38 81.25 
3 people keep, 3 people donate 92.03 92.19 
2 people keep, 4 people donate 96.04 97.91 
1 person keeps, 5 people donate 97.32 99.74 
6 people donate NA 100 
Table 5: Payoffs – Priority Treatment 
Cases Payoffs from Keeping Payoffs from Donating 
6 people keep 62.5 NA 
5 people keep, 1 person donates 73.98 85 
4 people keep, 2 people donate 84.38 85 
3 people keep, 3 people donate 92.03 85 
2 people keep, 4 people donate 96.04 85 
1 person keeps, 5 people donate 97.32 85 
6 people donate NA 85 
Table 6: Payoffs – Waiver & Priority Treatment 
Cases Payoff from Keeping Payoffs from Donating 
6 people keep 62.5 NA 
5 people keep, 1 person donates 73.98 100 
4 people keep, 2 people donate 84.38 100 
3 people keep, 3 people donate 92.03 100 
2 people keep, 4 people donate 96.04 100 
1 person keeps, 5 people donate 97.32 100 
6 people donate NA 100 
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2.4.2 Treatment Effect 
There are dominant strategies for the baseline, waiver treatment and waiver & 
priority treatment. A subject should always keep no matter what other group members 
do in the baseline. However, the strategy of donating is dominated in both the waiver 
treatment and waiver & priority treatment. There is a mixed strategy equilibrium in the 
priority treatment. The equilibrium probability of donating is 0.51 (see Appendix A.2 for 
detailed information). The hypothesis on the treatment effect is that the contribution 
level is raised higher by waiver or waiver & priority than by priority on its own.  
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The experimental sessions were conducted at Rice University and Texas A&M 
University from April to June 2015. Each session included either 12 or 18 subjects. A 
total of 150 subjects participated in the experiment. Table 7 displays how many subjects 
are included in each of the combinations of the games. The duration of each session was 
around 90 minutes. The average earnings were $22.60, including a $5 show-up fee. 
 
Table 7: Number of Groups (Subjects) in Each Combination of the Two Games 
 
 Game 2 
Game 1 Baseline Waiver Priority Waiver & Priority 
Baseline 6 Groups (36 Ss) 6 Groups (36 Ss) 5 Groups (30 Ss) 8 Groups (48 Ss) 
 
Recall that only the subjects with two units are eligible to make donation 
decisions in Phase 1 in each period of the game. Subjects with one or zero units at the 
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beginning of each period were not eligible to donate. They were not able to make any 
donation decisions at all for that period. When investigating subjects’ decisions, I focus 
on decisions made by subjects who had the chance to donate. 
Table 8 is a summary table that shows the average donation rate in each game by 
different combinations of treatments. The donation rate is equal to the number of times a 
subject donated over the number of periods the person was eligible to donate. A paired t 
test is used to examine the difference on average contribution rate between Game 1 and 
Game 2. When subjects play the baseline twice, the average donation rate is significantly 
decreased from 0.6 in Game 1 to 0.48 in Game 2 (p = 0.009). For the combinations of 
baseline – waiver and baseline – waiver & priority, average donations rates under the 
incentive treatments are significantly increased compared to the baseline (p = 0.075 and 
p = 0.000, respectively). However, the priority treatment does not have a big influence 
on the average donation rate compared to the baseline (p = 0.882). Additionally, when 
comparing Game 1’s different baselines, there is no significant difference across the 
different combinations (Kruskal-Wallis test, p = 0.185).   
Table 8: Average Contribution Rates 
Combination Game 1 Game 2 
Wilcoxon matched-pair 
signed-rank test 
Baseline – Baseline 
(n=36) 
0.60 
(0.061) 
0.48 
(0.064) 
p = 0.009 
Baseline – Waiver 
(n=36) 
0.47 
(0.059) 
0.60 
(0.063) 
p = 0.075 
Baseline – Priority 
(n=30) 
0.59 
(0.071) 
0.55 
(0.078) 
p = 0.882 
Baseline – Waiver & Priority 
(n=48) 
0.45 
(0.056) 
0.75 
(0.046) 
p = 0.000 
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2.5.2 Experimental Data vs. Theoretical Predictions 
In this section, I am comparing the average donation rate and the Nash 
equilibrium. Table 9 reports that the average donation rate deviates from the Nash 
equilibrium in the baseline, waiver treatment and waiver & priority treatment (p = 
0.000). In the priority treatment, there is no significant difference between the average 
donation rate and the Nash equilibrium (p = 0.909). Subjects are more generous in the 
baseline than the theory predicts. Although the full donation level is not achieved, 
waiver and waiver & priority help to increase their respective donation rates.    
Table 9: Average Donation Rate Compared to the Nash Equilibrium 
Treatment 
Average 
donation rate 
Nash equilibrium 
Wilcoxon  
signed-rank test 
Baseline 
(n=150) 
0.52 
(0.031) 
Donation rate = 0 P = 0.000 
Waiver 
(n=36) 
0.60 
(0.063) 
Donation rate = 1 P = 0.000 
Priority 
(n=30) 
0.55 
(0.078) 
Donation rate = 0.51 P = 0.909 
Waiver & Priority 
(n=48) 
0.75 
(0.046) 
Donation rate = 1 P = 0.000 
2.5.3 Within-subject Analysis 
Figure 1, 2, 3 and 4 present the average donation rates over time for each of the 
four combinations of the two games, respectively. Figure 1 demonstrates average 
donation rates under the situation of the baseline – baseline combination. Since both 
Game 1 and Game 2 are the same baseline treatment, the two average donation rate lines 
have similar steady downward trends. For the baseline – waiver, baseline – priority and 
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baseline – waiver & priority combinations, the average donation rate drops to a low level 
in the last period of Game 1, and then it is boosted to a high level right after being 
influenced by the shock of an incentive treatment. In Game 2, the average donation rate 
begins to decline or fluctuate after the first period under the baseline – waiver and 
baseline – priority combinations. The average donation rates are well sustained at a high 
level in the waiver & priority treatment under the baseline – waiver & priority 
combination. 
 
Figure 1: Average Donation Rate: Baseline – Baseline Combination 
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Figure 2: Average Donation Rate: Baseline – Waiver Combination 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Average Donation Rate: Baseline – Priority Combination 
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Figure 4: Average Donation Rate: Baseline – Waiver & Priority Combination 
Regression analysis is shown in Table 10 and 11, which present results using 
panel data within each combination. The dependent variable, donation, is a dummy 
variable. Conditional on the subject being eligible to donate, if the subject decides to 
donate in Phase 1, the dependent variable is 1; otherwise, it is 0. Since donating or not is 
a binary decision, the logit model is chosen to analyze the data.  
Independent variables are also dummy variables. Game 2 is 1 if it is the second 
game in the combination; otherwise it is 0. Thus, Game 2 could be the baseline, the 
waiver treatment, the priority treatment or the waiver & priority treatment. Before 
knowing the period earnings, subjects are informed about how many subjects in the 
group requested to purchase a unit in Phase 3, and how many subjects successfully make 
the purchase. The independent variable, Excess demand𝑡−1 , represents whether 
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everyone who requested to purchase successfully made the purchase or not in the 
preceding period. If there were not enough units in the group account for all of the 
subjects who requested to purchase units in the previous period, the Excess demand𝑡−1 
is 1; otherwise, it is 0. The independent variable, winner𝑡−1, is 1 if the subject was a 
winner in the lottery game in the preceding period; otherwise, it is 0. Regression 1a 
investigates the restart effect. Regression 2a, 3a and 4a focus on the incentive treatment 
effect. In order to control other factors that could possibly affect subjects’ decision 
making, I add independent variables, Excess demand𝑡−1 and winner𝑡−1, into regression 
1b, 2b, 3b and 4b. 
Table 10 and 11 present the results from running the logit regression and the 
marginal effects of its coefficients, respectively. If subjects play the baseline treatment 
again as Game 2, the probability of donating in Phase 1 of each period is significantly 
decreased by more than 0.2. Regression 3a and 3b show that compared to the baseline, 
adding the incentive treatment of priority does not make any significant difference on the 
likelihood of donating. However, the waiver treatment significantly increases the 
probability of donating by 0.21 in regression 2a and 0.26 in regression 2b, and the 
treatment combining both incentives, waiver & priority, greatly raises the probability of 
donation by 0.41 in regression 4a and 0.44 in regression 4b. 
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Table 10: Within-subject Analysis for Each Combination: Logit Model 
Dependent Variable: Donation 
Independent 
Variables 
Baseline- 
Baseline 
    (1a)  (1b) 
Baseline- 
Waiver 
     (2a)           (2b) 
Baseline- 
Priority 
   (3a)  (3b) 
Baseline- 
Waiver & Priority 
   (4a)           (4b) 
Game 2 -1.00***
(0.292)
-1.13***
(0.340)
0.84*** 
(0.257) 
1.05*** 
(0.309) 
-0.30
(0.337)
-0.36
(0.411)
2.00*** 
(0.266) 
2.11*** 
(0.399) 
Excess demand𝑡−1 0.46 
(0.411) 
0.28 
(0.402) 
2.53***
(0.819)
-0.05
(0.419)
Winner𝑡−1 0.26 
(0.350) 
-0.27
(0.316)
-0.75*
(0.469)
-0.64**
(0.300)
Constant 0.79 
(0.496) 
0.34 
(0.583) 
-0.20
(0.360)
-0.46
(0.469)
0.64 
(0.569) 
0.85 
(0.753) 
-0.24
(0.309)
-0.04
(0.455)
# of obs 392 320 400 328 324 264 491 395 
# of subjects 36 36 36 36 30 30 48 48 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
2.5.4 Between-subject Analysis 
In order to compare the difference between treatments in Game 2, I pool the data 
together to investigate the treatment effects between subjects in different combinations 
of the two treatments. The Game 2 variable is used to control for the order effect. Game 
2 is 1 if it is the second half of the experiment no matter what treatment it is; otherwise, 
it is 0. Waiver is 1 if it is in the waiver treatment and is 0 if it is not. Priority is 1 if it is 
Table 11: Within-subject Analysis for Each Combination: Marginal Effect of the Logit Model 
Dependent Variable: Donation 
Independent 
Variables 
Baseline- 
Baseline 
(1a)  (1b) 
Baseline- 
Waiver 
    (2a)           (2b) 
Baseline- 
Priority 
   (3a)  (3b) 
Baseline- 
Waiver & Priority 
   (4a)              (4b)  
Game 2 -0.24***
(0.073)
-0.28***
(0.078)
0.21*** 
(0.065) 
0.26*** 
(0.077) 
-0.07
(0.080)
-0.08
(0.098)
0.41*** 
(0.070) 
0.44*** 
(0.096) 
Excess demand𝑡−1 0.11 
(0.103) 
0.07 
(0.101) 
0.60***
(0.213)
-0.01
(0.088)
Winner𝑡−1 0.07 
(0.088) 
-0.07
(0.079)
-0.18
(0.113)
-0.14**
(0.065)
# of obs 392 320 400 328 324 264 491 395 
# of subjects 36 36 36 36 30 30 48 48 
Note: Delta-method standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively.  
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in the priority treatment and 0 if it is not. Same with the waiver & priority variable, 
Waiver & priority is 1 if it is in the waiver & priority treatment and 0 if it is not. 
Table 12 includes two models. Model 1 explores the different treatment effects 
by controlling the order effect. More controls are added into Model 2. Marginal effects 
of the coefficients are shown in Table 13. Results from Model 1 show that by playing the 
second game for another 6 periods, the probability of donating is decreased by 0.2 in 
general. This is mainly because subjects are more and more reluctant to make donations 
when there is no incentive offered. Preferential treatments are only conducted in Game 
2. Compared to the baseline in Game 2, the waiver treatment, priority treatment and 
waiver & priority treatment significantly increase the probability of subjects donating. 
The waiver treatment, priority treatment and waiver & priority treatment increase the 
probability by 0.39, 0.16 and 0.67, respectively. Offering both incentives at the same 
time, the waiver & priority treatment, has the biggest effect. The priority treatment alone 
has the smallest impact on influencing the probability of donating. When adding the 
control of the information on excess demand and the winning result from the preceding 
period, the waiver treatment and waiver & priority treatment still significantly increase 
the probability of donating. However, the priority treatment is no longer significant. If 
subjects know that not all of the people who requested to purchase a unit have 
successfully made their purchase in the last period, the probability of them donating in 
the current period is increased by 0.1. Winning in the preceding period will decrease the 
probability of donating in the current period by 0.08. 
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Table 12: Between-subject Analysis for Pooled Panel Data: Logit Model 
Dependent Variable: Donation 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Game 2 -0.84***
(0.270)
-0.93***
(0.310)
Waiver 1.64***
(0.366)
1.94***
(0.427)
Priority 0.67*
(0.402)
0.61 
(0.457) 
Waiver & Priority 2.84*** 3.34*** 
(0.372) (0.459) 
Excess demand𝑡−1 0.40* 
(0.222) 
Winner𝑡−1 -0.34
(0.169)** 
Constant 0.17 
(0.210) 
0.05 
(0.267) 
# of obs 1607 1307 
# of subjects 150 150 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Table 13: Between-subject Analysis for Pooled Panel Data: Marginal Effect of The Logit Model 
Dependent Variable: Donation 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Game 2 -0.20***
(0.064)
-0.23***
(0.076)
Waiver 0.39***
(0.088)
0.47***
(0.105)
Priority 0.16*
(0.095)
0.15 
(0.111) 
Waiver & Priority 0.67*** 0.81*** 
(0.092) (0.115) 
Excess demand𝑡−1 0.10* 
(0.054) 
Winner𝑡−1 -0.08**
(0.041)
# of obs 1607 1307 
# of subjects 150 150 
Note: Delta-method standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively.  
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2.6 Conclusion 
From the experiment, I observe that if there is no incentive offered to people for 
donating, people are less likely to donate as time passes as they learn that free riding on 
other people’s donations is the best strategy. In this paper, two different insurance-like 
incentive treatments are investigated along with a combined treatment. In the waiver 
treatment, units are provided free for previous donors. In the priority treatment, donors 
who lose in the lottery game are guaranteed the chance to purchase units. In the 
combined treatment, both incentives are implemented. People behave more generously 
in the baseline than the theory predicts. However, consistent with the comparative-
statistic prediction of the theory, results demonstrate that all three preferential treatments 
increase the probability of donating compared to the baseline (no-incentive) treatment. 
Results also indicate that the treatment that combines waiver and priority has the 
strongest impact on making a donating decision, while the treatment that includes only 
priority has the weakest impact among the three different treatments.     
These results imply that offering blood donors insurance plans could be an 
effective way to encourage more contributions in the real world. For people who donated 
blood to save other people’s lives, we should show our appreciation by giving them 
priority access when they encounter health issues that require them to have blood 
transfusions. Providing donors with both a transfusion fee waiver and priority access to 
blood is the most powerful policy. Although blood donor insurance has been adopted by 
a few blood banks, more blood institutes should take these special insurance-like 
incentives into consideration.  
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3. GROUP SIZE AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUNISHMENT IN PUBLIC
GOODS GAMES 
3.1 Introduction 
The public goods game has been one of the most influential games in economics. 
What especially interests people is that human behavior in the real world deviates from 
the theoretical prediction that people will not contribute to the public goods at all.  
In order to separate how factors influence the contribution level individually, lab 
experiments have been adopted as a method to study public goods game for decades. 
Studies show that different factors that affect people’s contribution levels in different 
ways. One of the issues that draws researchers’ attention is the correlation between the 
contribution level and the group size. Olson (1968) theoretically predicts that the 
provision of the common good would decrease when the group size increases. Isaac et 
al. (1994) conduct a public goods game varying the group sizes from 4, 10, 40 to 100 for 
different Marginal Per Capita Returns (MPCR) respectively. Authors conclude that when 
the MPCR is lower, the contributions in the group size of 40 and 100 treatments are 
significantly greater than in the group size of 4 and 10 treatments. Isaac and Walker 
(1998) examine the relationship between variations in group size and provision of public 
goods. The results demonstrate that increasing group size increases contributions when 
the MPCR is low. However, this effect is weak when MPCR is high. Goeree et al. 
(2002) compare treatments of two-person group and four-person group. They do not find 
any clear effect that the group size has on public goods provision.  
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In order to increase public-good contributions, different mechanisms have been 
investigated, among which the punishment mechanism is approved to be one of the most 
effective methods to sustain cooperation. Fehr and Gächter (2000) study how costly 
punishment affects contribution level under both “stranger” and “partner” protocols. In 
the experiment, participants are randomly divided into groups of four. Using a within-
subject design, subjects play a public goods game for a total of 20 periods, 10 periods 
with no punishment and the other 10 periods with punishment. In the punishment 
treatment, one more stage is added. After subjects play the normal linear public goods 
game, they are able to monitor other group members’ contributions and punish each 
other.  The paper shows that although the punishment is costly, it significantly raises 
contribution levels compared to those in the treatment without punishment. Gürerk et al. 
(2006) analyze public goods provision where participants can decide either to stay in a 
sanctioning institution or a sanction-free institution. The findings show that the 
population migrates to the sanctioning institution with strong cooperating behavior.   
The incentives for peer monitoring can be greatly affected by the group size since 
it becomes harder for individuals to monitor others when in a large group (Stiglitz 1993). 
Furthermore, the punishment mechanism would be less effective to elicit public goods 
contributions. There have been only a few experimental studies that examine the 
relationship between group size and punishment in public goods games. Following Fehr 
and Gächter (2000), Carpenter (2007) stimulate different punishment environment where 
each participant can punish all other group members, half of the group members, only 
one of the group members or cannot punish at all. Participants are assigned in either the 
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high MPCR (0.75) or the low MPCR (0.375) treatment. Sessions are run with either 
small (five-person) groups or large (ten-person) groups. They find that since punishment 
does not fall in ten-people treatments, contributions in the large groups are no lower than 
those in small groups. 
In order to directly address the question of how group size impacts the 
effectiveness of the punishment mechanism when it is introduced, we carefully pick 
three variations for the group size, 2, 8 and 24. 2 is the smallest group that can be formed 
to conduct a public goods game. Due to the capacity of our lab, we can only run a 
maximum of 24 subjects. 8 is the number we decide to pick between 2 and 24, which 
hasn’t be invested with. 
The detailed experiment design and procedure are detailed in the following 
section. In section 3, we discuss the results of data collected from the experiment. The 
conclusion is made at the end. 
3.2 Experimental Design and Procedure 
We use the public goods game design from Fehr and Gächter (2000) with a few 
modifications. Our game is different in the following two ways: 
1. Investigating the effect of changing group size in the public goods game is tricky.
Andreoni (2007) notes that people, especially those who are altruistic, care not only 
about the MPCR, but also the MGR (Marginal Group Return). As long as we want to 
study the effect of group size, it is impossible to control both MPCR and MGR since 
𝑀𝐺𝑅 = 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑅 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒. If the MPCR stays constant, the total surplus increases 
with an increasing group size. If the MGR stays constant, the MPCR decreases with an 
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increasing group size. In order to balance both the effects of MPCR and MGR on the 
contribution level and produce an initial average contribution of 50% of the subjects’ 
endowments, we calibrate MPCR based on prior experiment following the rule below,  
𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑅 =
1
𝑛
+ 0.1 
Then we round the MPCR up to the nearest multiple of 0.025.  
2. We use a simple linear punishment cost function. This cost function ensures that 
each participant can always afford to assign up to three punishment points. Therefore, in 
each period all the participants have equal punishment power.  
Each participant can only distribute up to three punishment points in total among 
the other group members. Therefore, each subject receives an average maximum of three 
punishment points no matter what the group size is under the punishment condition. 
Our design involves two treatment variables, group size and punishment.  The 
group size varies from 2, 8 to 24. Punishment is a dummy variable, either with no 
punishment or with punishment. Six treatments (𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 2, 8 𝑜𝑟 24 ×
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑛𝑜 𝑝𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) are consist of all the combinations of two 
treatment variables.  Calculated by MPCR rule in our experiment, the MPCR is 0.60, 
0.25, or 0.15 for the group size of 2, 8 or 24 respectively. Treatment conditions are listed 
in Table 14. 
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Table 14: Treatments 
                      Within – subject 
 
 
  Between – subject 
No Punishment  
(1-10 periods) 
Punishment  
(11-20 periods) 
n=2      MPCR=0.60 Treatment 1A Treatment 1B 
n=8      MPCR=0.25 Treatment 2A Treatment 2B 
n=24    MPCR=0.15 Treatment 3A Treatment 3B 
 
We use the partner-matching protocol considering the difficulties of using a 
stranger-matching protocol for 24-peson group treatments. At the beginning of each 
session, subjects are randomly assigned in to groups. The group composition remains the 
same throughout the experimental session. Each session includes 20 periods. Participants 
are told to play a standard public goods game with no punishment for 10 periods and 
then they are informed to play another 10 periods with punishment. The no-punishment 
condition is always followed by the punishment condition. This is because in previous 
studies, it has been confirmed as a robust result that punishment can significantly raise 
contribution levels no matter what the order is when a within-subject design is used. We 
also try to imitate that in the real world, a mechanism is usually brought in later to 
improve the performance of the current institution.       
Each period, each participant is endowed with 20 tokens. Under the “no 
punishment” condition, subjects need to decide either keep these tokens in the private 
account for himself or invest 𝑔𝑖 tokens (0 ≤ 𝑔𝑖 ≤ 20) into the group account. The period 
payoff for each subject 𝑖 is the tokens in his private account and the total tokens in the 
group account multiplied by the MPCR. The payoff equation for subject 𝑖 is given by 
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𝜋𝑖
𝑛𝑝 = 20 − 𝑔𝑖 + 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑅 × ∑ 𝑔𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
where 𝑗  is a subject in a group, n is the size of the group, and 𝑖 is the subject. 
Under the “punishment” condition, one more decision stage is added after all the 
subjects make their investment decisions. At the second stage, subjects are able to 
review each of the other group members’ investment to the group account. Subjects are 
then granted an opportunity to punish each other.     
Different from Fehr and Gaechter (2000), we use a linear punishment function 
that each punishment point assigned costs the punisher one token and deducts three 
tokens from the punishee’s earnings in the first stage. Each subject can assign up to a 
total number of three punishment points among the other group members no matter what 
the group size is. The minimum payoff after stage two is zero. The period payoff 
function for subject 𝑖 is written as, 
𝜋𝑖
𝑝 = 20 − 𝑔𝑖 + 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑅 × ∑ 𝑔𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗≠𝑖 − 3 × ∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑖
𝑛
𝑗≠𝑖       𝜋𝑖
𝑝 ≥ 0
Where 𝑝𝑖𝑗 is the number of punishment points subject 𝑖 assigns to his group member 𝑗, 
and 𝑝𝑗𝑖 is the number of punishment points subject 𝑖 receives from his group member 𝑗.  
Period payoff is cumulative. The total payoff is the sum of the 20-period payoffs.  
The experiment was conducted in the Economic Research Lab in Texas A&M 
University from April to June, 2015. Student participants were recruited through the 
Online Recruitment System (ORSEE) for Economic Experiments.  7 sessions were run 
with 168 subjects. Each session lasted about 70 minutes. The average earnings for each 
participant were $24.78 including a $5 show-up fee.   
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3.3 Results 
Result 1: The punishment mechanism significantly raises the average 
contribution level with a group size of 8 or 24; however, the increase in contributions in 
the punishment treatment is very small compared to in the no-punishment treatment with 
a group size of 2.    
Table 15 presents the data summary. In columns three and four, we show the 
average contribution over all ten periods of no punishment and with punishment 
treatment respectively. In column five, we list the average punishment points 
assigned/received by each participants when in the punishment treatment. This table 
reports that when group size is 8 or 24, introducing the punishment mechanism increases 
the contribution two times more than in the no punishment treatment. Nevertheless, 
when the group size is 2, the increase in the contribution is very small compared to the 
contribution in the no punishment treatment.  
We also use the nonparametric method, Wilcoxon rank sum test, to confirm that 
the difference in contribution between the no-punishment condition and the punishment 
condition is not significant (p=0.796) when the group size is 2. Nevertheless, the 
contributions in the no-punishment condition and those in punishment condition are 
significantly different when the group size is either 8 or 24 (p=0.000 in both cases).      
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Table 15: Data Summary 
Sample 
Size 
No Punishment 
Avg Contribution 
per Capita 
Punishment 
Avg Contribution 
per Capita 
Avg Punishment 
Points per Capita 
N=2 
MPCR=0.60 
24 subjects 
12 groups 
9.525 
(6.88) 
10.321 
(7.49) 
0.417 
(0.65) 
N=8 
MPCR=0.25 
48 subjects 
6 groups 
8.979 
(5.42) 
15.673 
(5.91) 
0.571 
(1.13) 
N=24 
MPCR=0.15 
96 subjects 
4 groups 
8.499 
(5.46) 
14.898 
(5.57) 
1.063 
(1.96) 
Result 2: Under the group size of 2 condition, average contributions over time 
are relatively stable in both no-punishment punishment and treatments; In contrast, 
under both group size of 8 and 24 conditions, average contributions drop dramatically 
over time in the no punishment treatment. The punishment not only significantly 
increases the contributions, but also well sustains the cooperation.   
Result 2 is supported by Figure 5, 6, and 7. These figures show the average 
contributions over time when group size is 2, 8 and 24 respectively. For group size of 2 
(Figure 5), the average contributions over time fall within the boundary of 7 and 12 in 
both the no-punishment treatment and punishment treatment. The punishment 
mechanism raises the average contribution level just a little. Participants decrease their 
contributions in the last period in both no-punishment treatment and punishment 
treatment. The average contributions in the last round reach their lowest values under 
both no punishment and punishment conditions.     
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For group size of 8 and 24 (Figure 6 and 7), under the no punishment condition, 
participants begin to drop their contributions after the 3rd period. Introducing the 
punishment mechanism immediately increase participants’ contributions and the 
cooperation is sustained till the last period.  
Figure 5: Average Contribution – Group Size of 2 
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Figure 6: Average Contribution – Group Size of 8 
Figure 7: Average Contribution – Group Size of 24 
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Result 3: The situation of “free riding” is notably improved by the punishment 
mechanism when the group sizes are 8 and 24. This is not the case when the group size 
is 2. 
Figure 8, 9 and 10 show the distributions for the pooled data for group size of 2, 
8 and 24 treatments with and without punishment. In figure 8, 24% of individual choices 
are 𝑔𝑖 = 0 and 29% of individual choices are   𝑔𝑖 = 20 with group size of 2. After 
introducing the punishment, 27% of individual choices are 𝑔𝑖 = 0 and 34% of individual 
choices are 𝑔𝑖 = 20. The two distributions are not significantly different from each other 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: p=0.440 in both cases).  
Figure 9 and 10 present distributions for group size of 8 and 24, respectively. In 
figure 2b, the relative frequency of choosing 𝑔𝑖 = 0 is 27% and it decreases to 3% in 
punishment treatment. Thirty-three percent of the choices are to make full contribution 
in the no punishment treatment. Adding the punishment mechanism almost doubles the 
number of full contribution decisions to 63%. The contribution distributions are 
significantly changed in punishment treatments in both figures (Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test: p=0.000 in both cases). This provides the evidence that punishment can effectively 
solve the free riding problems when group size is relatively large.     
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Figure 8: Distribution of Contributions – Group Size of 2  
 
 
Figure 9: Distribution of Contributions – Group Size of 8 
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Figure 10: Distribution of Contributions – Group Size of 24 
 
 
Result 4: Punishment is used more often when group is large. 
Figure 11, 12 and 13 show the probability of people who assign punishment 
points to their group members over periods in a group size of 2, 8 or 24 treatment 
respectively. Punishment is used most often when the group size is 24, although there is 
a decreasing trend.    
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Figure 11: Proportion of People Who Punish – Group Size of 2 
Figure 12: Proportion of People Who Punish – Group Size of 8 
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Figure 13: Proportion of People Who Punish – Group Size of 24 
Result 5: Punishment is more responsible for low contributions when group size 
is large. 
Table 16 contains three Tobit regressions for treatments with different group 
sizes, each with punishment. The dependent variable is a participant’s “received 
punishment points”. Independent variables are “other’s average contribution” which is 
the average contribution of all the other group members, “positive deviation” which is 
the difference of a subject’s contribution and the average contribution of his group 
members if his contribution is greater than that average contribution, and “absolute 
negative deviation” which is the absolute value of the difference of a subject’s 
contribution and other group members’ average contribution if his contribution is lower 
than the average. If a participant’s own contribution is equal to the average contribution 
of his group members, the “positive deviation” is set to be 0. 
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Table 16 indicates a strong correlation between received punishment points and 
absolute negative deviation. The lesser a participant’s contribution is than other group 
members’ average contribution, the more punishment points this participant would 
receive. A participant would receive 0.5 punishment points for every token less than the 
average contribution when the group size is 2. The received punishment points is 
increased to 1 with group size of 8 and to 1.98 with group size of 24. The punishment is 
more responsible for negative deviations when the group size is larger.  
 
Table 16:  Determinants of Getting Punished: Random Effect Tobit Results 
  Dependent Variable: Received Punishment Points 
Independent Variables Group Size of 2 Group Size of 8 Group Size of 24 
Other's Average 
Contribution 0.34*** 0.20*** 0.27*** 
 
(0.119) (0.065) (0.074) 
Absolute Negative 
Deviation 0.50*** 1.00*** 1.98*** 
 
(0.135) (0.077) (0.090) 
Positive Deviation 0.12 -1.02** 0.13 
 
(0.104) (0.453) (0.135) 
Constant -2.11 -1.40 -11.25*** 
 
(-1.301) (-1.014) (-1.307) 
N 24 48 96 
Wald Chi²(3) 15.08*** 179.54*** 509.10*** 
Log Likelihood -139.77 -248.63 -809.76 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%  respectively. The 
regression is a Tobit with both upper and lower censoring and individual random effects. 
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Result 6: Contributions respond more to punishment when the group size is 
large.  
Result 5 has shown that contributions lower than the other group members’ 
average contribution are punished more often. Although distributing punishment points 
to others are costly, people still punish those who made low contributions, especially in a 
repeated game, hoping to teach them a lesson, hoping that low contribution makers 
would raise their contributions in future periods.  
The MPCR and the group size change together. In order to isolate the effect of 
group size and rule out the effect of nonfixed MPCR on punishment, we run a regression 
on each separate data set of treatment with different group sizes respectively, then use 
Hausman test to compare the regression coefficients.     
Table 17 includes three regressions to test whether punishment works in the way 
that people expect. First column shows punishment cannot significantly increases 
contributions with a group size of 2. Second column illustrates that punishment 
significantly increase people’s contribution by 16.54 points with a group size of 8. The 
last column indicates that punishment raises the contribution by 10.80 with a group size 
of 24. The Hausman test demonstrates that the efficiency of punishment is significantly 
much higher to increase contributions levels when in large groups, group size of 8 or 24 
(p=0.000 in both cases). 
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Table 17: Determinants of Making Contributions: Random Effect Tobit Results 
Dependent Variable: Contribution 
Independent Variables Group Size of 2 Group Size of 8 Group Size of 24 
Punishment  1.14 16.54*** 10.80*** 
         (0.975) (1.058) (0.43) 
Constant 10.18*** 9.20*** 8.07*** 
(3.253) (1.940) (0.887) 
N 24 48 96 
Wald Chi²(1) 1.37 244.60*** 641.11*** 
Log Likelihood - 914.35 -1774.60 -4415.30
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The 
regression is a Tobit with both upper and lower censoring and individual random effects. 
Result 7: Efficiency is significantly increased by punishment when group size is 
large. 
The ultimate goal of introducing punishment into public goods games is not just 
to raise contribution levels, but also to increase social surplus. If people make great 
contributions to the public good but abuse punishment to decrease each other’s earnings 
in the second stage, the social efficiency is still low. Information in Table 18 displays 
how punishment affects efficiency with different group sizes respectively. The 
dependent variable is a subject’s period payoffs. Punishment is the independent variable 
which is a dummy variable. When group size is 2, there is a negative relationship 
between punishment and efficiency. Punishment decreases the period payoffs by 1.54 
tokens. When the group size is large, 8 or 24, this relationship becomes positive. 
Punishment increase the period payoffs by 4.41 and 12.47, respectively, which presents 
that punishment increase efficiency. 
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Table 18:  Period Payoffs and Punishment: Random Effect Tobit Results 
Dependent Variable: Period Payoffs 
Independent Variables Group Size of 2 Group Size of 8 Group Size of 24 
Punishment -1.54*** 4.41*** 12.47*** 
(0.342) (0.432) (0.455) 
Constant 21.94*** 28.98*** 42.10*** 
(0.510) (0.810) (1.119) 
N 24 48 96 
Wald Chi²(3) 20.21*** 104.50*** 751.23*** 
Log Likelihood -1331.07 -3247.06 -7277.64
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The 
regression is a Tobit with both upper and lower censoring and individual random effects. 
3.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper we tackle an important issue how group size and punishment 
interact. We examine this question from different aspects: 1) How does punishment 
influence contributions with different group sizes; 2) What are the determinants affect 
the usage of punishment with different group sizes; 3) What impacts does punishment 
have on social efficiency with different group sizes. We find that: 1) With a large group 
size, punishment significantly raises contribution levels; 2) Punishment is used more 
effectively when the group size is large; 3) Punishment can boost social efficiency with a 
large group size.  
We conclude that the effectiveness of punishment is greatly affected by group 
size in public goods games. Punishment has no effect on contribution levels when the 
group size small. However, when the group size is large, the provision of the public 
goods is dramatically raised by the introduction of punishment, and the cooperation can 
also be well sustained. 
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We attribute this phenomena to two reasons: 1) the revenge punishment, which is 
an inefficient punishment, is used more often when the group size is 2, since subjects 
who receive punishment would know the punishment points are from the other group 
member. In the next round, people who received punishment points assign punishment 
points to their group members even if their contributions a smaller than their group 
members’ contributions, just to revenge; 2) Although, on average, each person can 
receive up to 3 punishment points no matter what the group size is, when group size of 8 
or 24, it’s possible a person could receive up to 21 or 69 punishment points respective. 
Feeling the pressure of earn nothing is they make low contributions, subjects in large 
groups would rather make high contributions.  
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4. COMPETE OR COOPERATE? RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN THE NON-
CONSTANT-SUM COLONEL BLOTTO GAME 
4.1 Introduction 
A laboratory experiment is used to investigate the non-constant Colonel Blotto 
game with symmetric resources. In this game, two players are asked to simultaneously 
allocate any portion of their identical endowments across several prizes. Each prize has 
an equal symmetric value for both players. Players’ earnings consist of the prizes they 
win and their remaining endowments. The player who allocates the most resources to a 
prize wins it with certainty. I check on subjects’ behavior under both repeated and 
random matching protocols.     
I compare the experimental results with theoretical predictions of the Nash 
Equilibria proposed by Roberson and Kvasov (2012). It turns out that although most bids 
fall within the predicted boundaries, people significantly underbid compared to the Nash 
Equilibrium. I also find that bidders collude under both matching protocols.     
The Colonel Blotto game is originally introduced by Borel in 1921. It is a 
fundamental model for multidimensional strategic resource allocation and later has been 
widely applied to many fields from warfare, terrorism, political election, to markets. In 
this standard version of the Colonel Blotto game two players receive the same amount of 
endowments and need to allocate these endowments across three battlefields. Each 
battlefield is won by the player who allocates a greater amount of resources to it. In other 
words, “auction” contest success function is used to decide who wins the prize. Since in 
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this game the payoff for each player equals to the number of battlefields he or she wins, 
both players must spend all their resources to maximize the expected number of 
battlefields they win. As the property of the endowment is “use it or lose it,” it is called 
“constant-sum” Colonel Blotto game. 
Throughout other theoretical literature, Friedman (1958) uses the “lottery” 
contest success function, in which the probability of winning a battlefield equals the 
ratio of a player’s resource allocation to the total resources allocated to that battlefield. 
He also investigates the Colonel Blotto game giving players asymmetric endowments 
and providing a strategic solution. Roberson (2006) finds the existence of unique 
equilibrium payoffs for the Colonel Blotto game using the “auction” contest success 
function. Players can be endowed with either symmetric or asymmetric amount of 
resources.   
Chowdhury, Kovenock and Sheremeta (2013) experimentally examine the 
Colonel Blotto game with players receiving asymmetric resources. They argue that in the 
“lottery” contest success function treatment, players divided their resources equally 
across all battlefields. On the other hand, in the “auction” contest success function 
treatment, where the player with the largest force in a particular battle wins that 
battlefield with certainty, disadvantaged players (with less endowment) stochastically 
allocate zero resources to a subset of battlefields.    
Cinar and Goksel (2012) research different Colonel Blotto Games giving players 
either symmetric resources or asymmetric resources. The number of battlefields is 6 and 
10 respectively. In each treatment, subjects play the game for 12 periods against a 
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computer program which has been coded to play the optimal strategy predicted by the 
theory. They confirm that players are more likely to win if they have more resources 
than their counterparts. 
The literature above concerns constant-sum Colonel Blotto games, in which 
players’ resources have no values for themselves and their earnings depend on how may 
battlefields they win. However, over the years, different variants of Colonel-Blotto-like 
games have been developed to address different problems. Kvasov (2007) introduces a 
non-constant-sum version of the Colonel Blotto game, in which unused resources are 
valuable for players and player also try to maximize the total value of objects. Games 
incorporating this insight have been defined as “non-constant-sum” contests. That article 
characterizes that mixed-strategy equilibria in the case of identical values and symmetric 
budgets and analyzes its connections with the standard version of the Colonel Blotto 
game. Roberson and Kvasov (2012) extend the analysis of the non-constant-sum version 
of the Colonel Blotto game to a more general case which allows players to receive 
asymmetric budgets. They derive the equilibrium for the non-constant-sum Colonel 
Blotto game and conclude that if the level of asymmetry is below a threshold, there 
exists a one-to-one mapping from the unique set of equilibrium univariate marginal 
distribution functions in the constant-sum game to those in the non-constant-sum game. 
However, this relationship can be broken down if players’ budgets exceed this threshold. 
The authors also characterize the unique equilibrium, the total expected expenditure, and 
the unique equilibrium payoff. 
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There has been some experimental literature investigating contest games which 
are similar to the non-constant-sum version of the Colonel Blotto game. Mago and 
Sheremeta (2012) examine subjects’ behavior in simultaneous non-constant-sum three-
battlefield contest. In their game the payer expending the highest effort in a battlefield 
wins that battlefield and the player who wins two or three battlefields wins the contest. 
They discover that, contrary to theoretical predictions, most of the time subjects make 
positive bids in each battle, these bids fall within the predicted boundaries and they 
significantly overbid.    
Irfanoglu et al. (2011) modify Mago and Sheremeta’s game by using the lottery 
contest success function. Contrary to the theoretical prediction, most subjects vary their 
allocation between different battlefields in a specific period and within battlefields over 
time. Mago, Sheremeta and Yates (2013) design a non-constant-sum multi-battlefields 
experiment, in which two players simultaneously divide effort across three battlefields 
using the auction contest success function mechanism. They find over-expenditure of 
resources relative to the Nash Equilibrium benchmark. They speculate this result might 
come from the inexperienced subjects, a non-monetary utility of winning, or the possible 
impact of sunk costs in the preceding period.  
There are a number of experimental studies on different non-constant-sum 
Colonel-Blotto-like contests. However, our paper focuses on the standard version of the 
non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game, in which two players allocate resources across 
several prizes. A prize is won by the bidder offering the largest resources. The goal of a 
subject is to spend the least resources to win the most prizes. Furthermore, I explore the 
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game under different matching protocols, and with different numbers of prizes. I find 
there is no big difference under the repeated matching protocol and random matching 
protocol. Subjects under the repeated matching protocol always underbid compared to 
the expected Nash Equilibrium. However, under the random protocol, subjects underbid 
only when there are 8 prizes and they bid around the expected Nash Equilibrium when 
there are either 3 or 5 prizes.  
The remaining of this section is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the 
model and the theoretical solutions of the non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game. In 
section 4.3, I detail the experimental design and procedure, and also raise theoretical 
predictions specifically for the setup of our game. Section 4.4 represents the results. A 
concluding section in the end summarizes.  
4.2 Theoretical Background 
Following Kvasov (2007), I assume a game in which two players, A and B, each 
have an equal, fixed amount of budget, 𝑋𝑖  for 𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵 . Let 𝑋𝐴 = 𝑋𝐵 . Two players 
simultaneously compete in a series of battlefields, each of which has the same 
commonly known value 𝑣. The total number of battlefields is a finite 𝑛 ≥ 3. I use  𝑥𝑖𝑗 to 
denote player 𝑖’s bid on the 𝑗th prize, where 𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛 and 𝑥𝑖𝑗 is nonnegative. Each 
battlefield can be treated as an independent all-pay auction. For the 𝑗th battlefield, the 
player who makes the highest bid wins its prize 𝑣  with certainty. Otherwise, the player 
loses. So the net payoff of player 𝑖 for a bid of 𝑥𝑖𝑗 is equal to the value of the battlefield 
minus the bid he/she has spent: 
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𝜋𝑖𝑗(𝑥𝑖𝑗 , 𝑥−𝑖𝑗) = {
𝑣 − 𝑥𝑖𝑗   𝑖𝑓 𝑥𝑖𝑗 >  𝑥−𝑖𝑗
−𝑥−𝑖𝑗  𝑖𝑓 𝑥𝑖𝑗 <  𝑥−𝑖𝑗
where if both player, 𝑖 and – 𝑖 (player 𝑖’s counterpart), offer the same bid to a battlefield, 
each player wins the battlefield with equal probability 
1
2
. 
For each player 𝑖, the budget constraint can be denoted as: 
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑋𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
The solution to the non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game described above has 
been derived by Roberson and Kvasov (2012). Although the class of multi-battlefield 
contest games has no pure strategy equilibria, the authors introduce the modified budgets 
for the game with three or more battlefields. The modified budgets are the equilibrium 
total expected expenditures which are unique. 
If 𝑋𝐴, 𝑋𝐵, 𝑣, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛 ≥ 3  satisfy (
2
𝑛
) min{𝑣, 𝑋𝐵} < 𝑋𝐴 ≤ 𝑋𝐵 , the unique
equilibrium total expected expenditure for player A is 𝑀𝑋𝐴(𝑋𝐴, 𝑋𝐵) = min {𝑋𝐴, (
𝑛𝑣
2
)} and 
the unique equilibrium total expected expenditure for player B is 𝑀𝑋𝐵(𝑋𝐴, 𝑋𝐵) =
min {𝑋𝐵, (
𝑛𝑣
2
) , (𝑛𝑣
𝑋𝐴
2
)
1
2
} . The unique equilibrium expected payoff for player A is 
𝑛𝑣𝑀𝑋𝐴
2𝑀𝑋𝐵
− 𝑀𝑋𝐴 , and the unique equilibrium expected payoff for player B is 𝑛𝑣(1 −
𝑀𝑋𝐴
2𝑀𝑋𝐵
) − 𝑀𝑋𝐵. Mixed strategy equilibrium on each battlefield for each player follows a
marginal distribution function of resources. Player A’s unique set of univariate marginal 
distribution functions is: 
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 ∀𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, … , 𝑛},          𝐹𝐴𝑗(𝑥𝑗) = (1 −
𝑀𝑋𝐴
𝑀𝑋𝐵
) +
𝑥𝑗
(
2
𝑛
)𝑀𝑋𝐵
(
𝑀𝑋𝐴
𝑀𝑋𝐵
)        𝑓𝑜𝑟    𝑥𝑗 ∈ [0,
2
𝑛
𝑀𝑋𝐵] 
Player B’s unique set of univariate marginal distribution functions is: 
∀𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, … , 𝑛},          𝐹𝐵𝑗(𝑥𝑗) =
𝑥𝑗
(
2
𝑛) 𝑀𝑋𝐵
       𝑓𝑜𝑟    𝑥𝑗 ∈ [0,
2
𝑛
𝑀𝑋𝐵] 
A more detailed description of the Nash equilibrium solution of our experimental 
game is provided in Section 4.3.2. 
4.3 Experimental Environment 
4.3.1 Experimental Design 
This experimental design consists of six treatments in which matching protocols 
differ, and under each matching protocol, the number of prizes is varied from 8, to 5, to 
3. Three components are included in each experimental session. A risk-preference 
elicitation task is conducted at the beginning of the experiment. According to Eckel and 
Grossman (2008), each subject is asked to make a choice among six 50/50 lotteries. The 
second part is the non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game. Subjects play the game either 
with same counterparts or different counterparts for each period. I ask subjects to 
answers some survey questions at the end.  
In the non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game, subjects are placed in pairs and 
receive 200 tokens as endowments. Both players allocate their tokens across 8 prizes. 
Subjects may allocate any number of tokens between 0 and 200 to any prize. The total 
number of tokens they spend on prizes must be less than or equal to 200. Tokens not 
spent count towards their earnings. After all subjects in the session submit their 
allocation decisions for a period, the computer displays which prizes they have won. 
 55 
 
Each prize is worth 25 tokens to the winner and 0 tokens to the loser. The winner of each 
prize is chosen by using the “auction” contest success function, in which the subject, 
who offers a higher bid on a prize than his/her counterpart, wins the particular prize with 
certainty. If both players allocate the same amount of tokens to a prize, the computer 
randomly chooses one of them as the winner. Figure 14 below displays the sample 
structure of the game for the 8-prize case as an example. 
 
Figure 14: Sample Structure of the Experimental Design Illustration for 8 Prizes 
 
 
 
 
 
After all subjects make their decisions, results for that period are revealed to the 
subjects. Subjects are informed how their counterparts allocated the 200 tokens across 
the 8 prizes, how many prizes they won, their own period earnings and cumulated 
earnings. Subjects play the game repeatedly for 15 periods. 
In the treatments with 5 prizes, the only difference is that the endowment for 
each subject is reduced to 125. In the treatments with 3 prizes, each subjects only 
receives 75 tokens as the endowment. This ensures each subject’s budget always equals 
the total value of the prizes. 
Player 2 (200) 
25  25  25  
25  25  25  25  25  
Player 1 (200) 
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There are two treatment variables: matching protocol and the number of prizes. 
Matching protocol enables us to implement either a repeated matching treatment or a 
random matching treatment. Subjects are matched with the same counterparts for the 
entirety of the session of the repeated matching treatment. However, in each session of 
the random matching treatment, subjects are matched with different counterparts for 
each period. Number of prizes varies from 8, to 5 to 3 (see Table 19).   
 
 
 
4.3.2 Theoretical Hypotheses 
I have discussed the general equilibrium solution for the non-constant-sum 
Colonel Blotto game Section 4.2. Here I apply this solution to propose hypotheses for 
our present experimental design. In our game, both players receive symmetric 
endowments of 200 tokens, a prize is worth 25 tokens, and there are 8 prizes to distribute 
Table 19: Six Treatments 
 
8 Prizes 
(Endowment: 200 tokens 
200 tokens = $1) 
5 Prizes 
(Endowment: 125 tokens 
125 tokens = $1) 
3 Prizes 
(Endowment: 75 tokens 
75 tokens = $1) 
Repeated-
matching 
Treatment 1 
 
Treatment 3 
 
Treatment 5 
 
Stranger-
matching 
Treatment 2 Treatment 4 Treatment 6 
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resources to. The mixed Nash equilibria require each player to distribute the resources 
following the univariate marginal distribution below.   
∀𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, … , 𝑛},          𝐹𝑖𝑗(𝑥𝑗) =
𝑥𝑗
25
       𝑓𝑜𝑟    𝑥𝑗 ∈ [0, 25] 
Each player’s equilibrium total expected expenditure is 100 tokens. The net 
payoffs of using the 100 tokens, in equilibrium, is 0 tokens. So for each player, his/her 
expected period earnings are 200 tokens.  
Following the same procedure, I can get that each player’s equilibrium total 
expected expenditure is 62.5 when the number of prizes is 5. Individual expected period 
earnings are 125 tokens. When there are 3 prized, each player’s equilibrium total 
expected expenditure is 37.5 and the expected period earnings are 75. 
4.3.3 Experimental Procedure 
Three sessions of the repeated matching treatment with 8 prizes are conducted at 
the Center of Behavioral and Experimental Economic Science at University of Texas at 
Dallas during July and August of 2012. The rest of the sessions are conducted at the 
Economic Research Lab at Texas A&M University in 2014 and 2015. This is a 
computerized experiment, programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). A total of 216 
subjects participated in 18 sessions (12 subjects in each session). Our subjects include 
both undergraduate students and graduate students who have never participated in this 
study before.  
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Instructions are paper-based and were read aloud by our experimenter. 7 In the 
first part of each session, I completed the risk-preference task. However, the result of 
this task was not disclosed until the end of the experiment. In the second part, subjects 
Ire informed that there would be 15 decision-making periods. I also collected subjects’ 
demographic information through a questionnaire at the end of each session.  
Only 1 of 12 subjects was randomly selected and paid for his/her decision 
making in the risk-preference elicitation task. All subjects Ire paid for all the 15 periods 
in the second part.  And the earnings from this part needed to be converted into US 
dollars at the end of the experiment. The exchange rate was 200 tokens = $1 when the 
number of prizes is 8, 125 tokens to $1 when the number of prizes is 5 and 75 tokens = 
$1 when the number of prizes is 3. In addition to what they earned in the experiment, 
participants Ire also paid a $5 show-up fee. On average, subjects earned $21.75 each, 
which was paid in cash, in private. Each experimental session took around 80 minutes.  
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Average Bids Compared to the Nash Equilibrium Benchmarks 
There are 3240 observations from 216 subjects in total. Each subject participated 
in only one of the six sessions. Table 20, 21 and 22 summarize the average bid of each 
prize for each matching protocol treatment with 8, 5 and 3 prizes respectively.  
7 The instructions are included in Appendix C. 
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        Table 20: Average Bid per Prize vs. Nash Equilibrium Bid per Prize – 8 Prizes 
 
Prize 
1 
Prize 
2 
Prize 
3 
Prize 
4 
Prize 
5 
Prize 
6 
Prize 
7 
Prize 
8 
Total 
Nash Equilibrium Bid 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 100 
Repeated 
Matching 
Mean 
Bid 
(StDev) 
8.76 
(5.23) 
9.79 
(6.04) 
9.67 
(5.95) 
9.36 
(5.35) 
8.94 
(5.68) 
9.30 
(5.62) 
8.71 
(5.49) 
8.85 
(5.46) 
73.37 
(41.75) 
t-test -4.29 -2.70 -2.86 -3.52 -3.77 -3.42 -4.14 -4.01 -3.83 
Random 
Matching 
Mean 
Bid 
(StDev) 
10.71 
(8.60) 
8.37 
(6.11) 
8.82 
(7.52) 
7.92 
(5.57) 
8.08 
(5.49) 
8.61 
(5.62) 
7.46 
(4.93) 
7.95 
(4.94) 
67.93 
(40.88) 
t-test -1.25 -4.05 -2.94 -4.94 -4.82 -4.15 -6.13 -5.52 -4.70 
  
Table 21: Average Bid per Prize vs. Nash Equilibrium Bid per Prize – 5 Prizes 
 Prize 1 Prize 2 Prize 3 Prize 4 Prize 5 Total 
Nash Equilibrium Bid 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 62.5 
Repeated 
Matching 
Mean 
Bid 
(StDev) 
10.18 
(5.66) 
8.90 
(3.69) 
9.10 
(3.78) 
8.66 
(3.39) 
8.77 
(3.02) 
45.62 
(17.80) 
t-test - 2.46 - 5.85 - 5.39 - 6.78 - 7.42 - 5.69 
Random 
Matching 
Mean 
Bid 
(StDev) 
11.81 
(7.20) 
11.51 
(6.19) 
11.43 
(6.32) 
11.04 
(5.74) 
11.14 
(6.49) 
56.94 
(30.21) 
t-test - 0.57 - 0.96 - 1.01 - 1.51 - 1.26 - 1.10 
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Table 22: Average Bid per Prize vs. Nash Equilibrium Bid per Prize – 3 Prizes 
 Prize 1 Prize 2 Prize 3 Total 
Nash Equilibrium Bid 12.5 12.5 12.5 37.5 
Repeated 
Matching 
Mean Bid 
(StDev) 
10.30 
(4.57) 
10.10 
(4.60) 
9.53 
(4.10) 
29.94 
(12.86) 
t-test - 2.89 - 3.12 - 4.35 - 3.53 
Random 
Matching 
Mean Bid 
(StDev) 
11.02 
(4.25) 
10.98 
(4.30) 
12.15 
(4.24) 
34.15 
(10.94) 
t-test - 2.08 - 2.11 - 0.49 - 1.83 
 
Each table above presents the average bid for each of the prizes and the total bid 
across all prizes under both repeated matching protocol and random matching protocol. 
Each table also provides t values which indicate the differences between the mean bids 
and expected Nash equilibrium bids.  
Result 1: On average, subjects always underbid in the repeated matching 
treatments regardless of the number of prizes.  
Theoretical equilibrium strategies predict that each player should allocate a 
random number, between 0 and 25, to each prize, and the total number of token spent 
across 8, 5 and 3 prizes should be summed up to 100, 62.5, and 37.5 respectively. I 
would expect each player to allocate 12.5 tokens to each prize on average. However, I 
find average bids are less 12.5. Players significantly underbid compared to the expected 
allocation of Nash equilibrium for each prize.  
I attribute this underbidding phenomenon to the collusion between the two 
players. The nature of the repeated non-constant sum Colonel Blotto game offers 
 61 
 
subjects with incentives to collude. A common solution to eliminate the collusion is to 
use random matching protocol instead of using repeated matching protocol. However, I 
find collusion happened under both protocols. Most subjects choose to use the minimal-
bid strategy (Kwasnica and Sherstyuk, 2007), in which they allocate low prices across 
prizes. I impute subjects’ collusive behavior to the complex and less competitive bidding 
environment. First, bidders are easily able to collude by perceiving counterparts’ 
collusive signals when the number of players in the auction market is small. Van Huyck 
et al. (1990) conclude that groups with just two players can tacitly coordinate more 
easily than can groups with more players. Kwasnica and Sherstyuk (2007) find that 
coordination on payoff-superior collusive outcomes can always be achieved in ascending 
multiple-prize auctions, as long as there are only two bidders in the market. Second, our 
game is a multiple-prize auction. Subjects can simply split the market by tacitly 
colluding. Phillips et al (2003) and Kwasnica and Sherstyuk (2013) both find that 
quantity for sale is a key collusion-facilitating feature in the auction. Multiple prizes 
generate some strategic uncertainties, especially when there are more prizes, which may 
persuade subjects not to bid a large amount of tokens on each prize. Third, subjects 
participate in the game repeatedly for 15 periods. It is easy for experienced players to 
aware that they can increase their expected payoff if they coordinate on collusive bids.  
4.4.2 Repeated Matching Protocol vs. Random Matching Protocol 
4.4.2.1 Aggregate-level Results 
The experiment is conducted by using both repeated matching protocol and 
random matching protocol to test whether there are any differences either on the level of 
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total bids or distributions of bids between these two matching protocols. Table 23, 24 
and 25 below summarize statistics of average individual bids over all prizes and periods 
for 8-prize, 5-prizes and 3-prize cases respectively. 
Table 23: Descriptive Statistics: Overall Average Bids – 8 Prizes 
Table 24: Descriptive Statistics: Overall Average Bids – 5 Prizes 
Table 25: Descriptive Statistics: Overall Average Bids – 3 Prizes 
Result 2: At the aggregate level, the difference between the repeated matching 
protocol and random matching is insignificant.     
Treatment 
Number of 
Subjects 
Average Bid 
(StDev) 
Minimum Bid Maximum Bid 
Repeated 
Matching 
36 
9.17 
(5.22) 
0 50 
Random 
Matching 
36 
8.49 
(5.11) 
0 60 
Treatment 
Number of 
Subjects 
Average Bid 
(StDev) 
Minimum Bid Maximum Bid 
Repeated 
Matching 
36 
9.12 
(3.56) 
0 55 
Random 
Matching 
36 
11.39 
(6.04) 
0 125 
Treatment 
Number of 
Subjects 
Average Bid 
(StDev) 
Minimum Bid Maximum Bid 
Repeated 
Matching 
36 
9.98 
(4.29) 
0 45 
Random 
Matching 
36 
11.38 
(3.65) 
0 35 
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Table 23 shows that when subjects bid across 8 prizes, the average bid under the 
random matching protocol is even smaller than under the repeated matching protocol, 
which is in contradiction of previous experimental studies arguing that bids in the 
random matching treatment are usually slightly higher than in the repeated matching 
treatment in contests (Lugovskyy et al, 2010; Vandegrift and Yavas, 2010; Baik et al, 
2013). Table 24 and 25 present that the average bids are a little higher when subjects 
need to bid across 5 prizes and 3 prizes. However, none of these differences between 
average bids of different protocols in our game is statistically significant.  
To get an intuitive grasp of how frequently subjects use specific allotments, 
Figure 15, 16 and 17 display the distribution of pooled bids under each number of prizes 
condition. I find most bids still fall between the predicted boundaries, through 0 to 25. 
Subjects use 0-token bid more frequently in the repeated matching treatment than in the 
random matching treatment, which implies more attempts to achieve maximum payoff-
superior collusive outcomes in the repeated matching treatment. Nevertheless, there are 
more bids exceeding the expected Nash Equilibria in the repeated matching treatment, 
which leads to a higher average bid compared to the random matching treatment.     
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Figure 15: Distribution of Pooled Bids – 8 Prizes 
 
 
Figure 16: Distribution of Pooled Bids – 5 Prizes 
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Figure 17: Distribution of Pooled Bids – 3 Prizes 
 
 
4.4.2.2 Individual-level Results 
Section 4.4.2.1 suggests that there are no significant differences across the 
repeated matching protocol and random matching protocol. In this section, I will focus 
on individual behavior. I run several random effect panel regressions of individual-level 
bids to check how it would be affected by control variables.  
I choose 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑗 as the dependent variable, where 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑗 is player 𝑖’s allocation of 
tokens to the 𝑗 th prize in  the 𝑡 th period. Model 1 includes one dummy, stranger 
treatment, as the independent variable. More control variables are added to model 2. 
“Lag of own bid” denotes player 𝑖’s allocation to the same prize in the previous period, 
“previous period win” is a dummy variable denoting whether player 𝑖 won that specific 
prize in the previous period, and “lag of counterpart’s bid” denotes the counterpart’s 
distribution to that prize in the previous period. I also control for several demographic 
variables such as gender and risk preference. To be specific, both gender and risk 
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preference are dummies, where “female” equals 1 if this subject is a female; “risk-
seeking” equals 1 indicating that the subject has chosen option 4, 5, or 6 in the risk-
preference elicitation task. Model 1 emphasizes the treatment effect that includes all the 
observations. Data are also divided for repeated-matching treatment and random-
matching treatment separately to compare how these control variables affect individual 
decision-making within each treatment.  
Result 3: At the individual level, there is no significant difference between 
repeated matching protocol and random matching protocol. 
In Table 26, 27 and 28 below, the “stranger” dummy capturing the treatment 
effect turns out to be insignificant in either model 1 or model 2, although some control 
variables are significant in model 2. This suggests that there is no significant difference 
on the quantitative level of bids in the repeated matching or random matching protocol. 
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Table 26: Regressions on Determinants of Allocation to a Prize – 8 Prizes 
 
Dependent Variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Individual Bid on One Prize  Overall Overall Repeated Random 
Stranger -0.681 -0.385   
 (1.21) (0.62)   
Lag of Own Bid          0.485***         0.332***         0.612*** 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) 
Lag of Win Indicator  -0.652   0.270   -1.265* 
  (0.51) (0.58) (0.69) 
Lag of Counterpart’s Bid          0.108***         0.241***   0.002 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Period        0.081**   0.088     0.072* 
  (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) 
Risk-seeking    0.820       1.685**   0.152 
  (0.61) (0.69) (0.77) 
Constant        9.171***         3.121***       2.449**         3.374*** 
 (0.86) (0.71) (1.19) (0.76) 
observations 8,640 8,064 4,032 4,032 
number of subjects 72 72 36 36 
R-sq 0.001 0.260 0.227 0.351 
Where * and ** indicate significance at 5% and 1% levels. I use OLS regressions. Standard errors, provided in parentheses, are 
clustered at individual level for Model 1, 2 and 4, and at both individual level and group level for Model 3. 
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Table 27: Regressions on Determinants of Allocation to a Prize – 5 Prizes 
 
Dependent Variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Individual Bid on One Prize  Overall Overall Repeated Random 
Stranger 2.264 1.192   
  (1.16) (0.73)   
Lag of Own Bid  0.395** 0.269** 0.438** 
   (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Lag of Win Indicator  -0.372 -0.426 0.411 
   (0.42) (0.47) (0.80) 
Lag of Counterpart’s Bid  0.064* 0.146** 0.051 
   (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Period  0.035 0.006 0.059 
   (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) 
Risk-seeking  -0.186 -1.280* 0.560 
   (0.72) (0.60) (1.11) 
Constant 9.123** 5.027** 6.216** 4.898** 
  (0.59) (0.79) (1.15) (1.20) 
Observations 5,400 5,040 2,520 2,520 
Number of Subjects 72 72 36 36 
R-sq 0.016 0.186 0.133 0.229 
Where * and ** indicate significance at 5% and 1% levels. I use OLS regressions. Standard errors, provided in parentheses, are 
clustered at individual level for Model 1, 2 and 4, and at both individual level and group level for Model 3. 
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Table 28: Regressions on Determinants of Allocation to a Prize – 3 Prizes 
Dependent Variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Individual Bid on One Prize  Overall Overall Repeated Random 
Stranger 1.406 0.925   
  (0.93) (0.65)   
Lag of Own Bid  0.336** 0.332** 0.335** 
   (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) 
Lag of Win  Indicator  -0.156 -1.716 1.250 
   (0.70) (0.96) (0.71) 
Lag of Counterpart’s Bid  0.045 0.024 0.073 
   (0.05) (0.08) (0.04) 
Period  0.060 0.008 0.107 
   (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) 
Risk-seeking  0.497 -1.764 0.456 
   (0.63) (1.13) (0.75) 
Constant 9.171** 6.147** 8.352** 5.160*** 
  (0.86) (0.89) (1.30) (0.97) 
Observations 3,240 3,024 1,512 1,512 
Number of Subjects 72 72 36 36 
R-sq 0.007 0.123 0.104 0.164 
Where * and ** indicate significance at 5% and 1% levels. I use OLS regressions. Standard errors, provided in parentheses, are 
clustered at individual level for Model 1, 2 and 4, and at both individual level and group level for Model 3. 
 
Result 4: Subjects in the repeated matching treatment use different strategies to 
make their decisions from those in the random matching treatment. 
The “lag of own bid” coefficient is positive and significant in both the model 3 
and model 4 in Table 26, 27 and 28, which implies that there is a strong serial correlation 
in each treatment. Subjects are inclined to bid more than in the previous period. 
Moreover, not only will the allotment of resources in the previous period affect a subject 
allocation decision for the current period, but the result from the previous period will 
also influence it. So I create an interaction term combining these two factors together to 
capture the joint effect. Although this interaction term in significant in both model 3 and 
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4, it imposes a positive effect on the bid under repeated matching protocol and a 
negative effect on the bid in the random matching treatment. This is an interesting 
finding. In the repeated matching treatment, a subject is always paired with the same 
counterpart. If a subject won a specific prize in the previous period because of a lager 
bid than his/her counterpart, this subject should have expected that the counterpart would 
spend more to win the prize in this current period. So he/she is motivated by winning the 
prize in the previous period and will allocate more resources to that prize to win it again. 
On the other hand, in the random matching treatment, a subject plays the game with a 
different counterpart in each period. Winning a prize in the previous period could 
possibly make the subject realize that it was actually not necessary to spend that amount 
of tokens, taking the counterpart’s bid as reference. So this subject may reduce his/her 
bid in the current period. The counterpart’s bid in the previous period can only positively 
and significantly affect a subject’s decision making for the current period under the 
repeated matching protocol, whereas it is insignificant in the random matching 
treatment.  
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This result may be due to the fact that if a player repeatedly plays the game with 
the same counterpart, he/she would try to figure out the pattern of the counterpart’s 
strategy when makes his/her own decision. A player allocates more resources to the 
prize in the current period than his/her counterpart’s allocation in the last period. Yet, if 
a player meets a new counterpart every period, it’s no longer necessary to take the last 
counterpart’s decision making into account.   
4.4.3 8 Prizes vs. 5 Prizes vs. 3 Prizes 
Model 1 and 2 in Table 29 includes the data from all the sessions. No significant 
effect is found in either the matching protocol or number of prizes. In order to isolate the 
effect of how the number of prizes affects individual bids, the data are separated into two 
sets, under repeated matching condition and random matching condition. Model 5 and 6 
show that the bid is significantly decreased by more than 2 tokens under the random 
matching protocol when there are 8 prizes.   
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Table 29: Regressions on Determinants of Individual Allocations to a Prize 
Dependent Variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Individual Bid on One Prize 
Priprize 
Overall Overall Repeated Repeated Random Random 
Stranger 0.631 2.264* 
  (0.73) (1.15) 
8 Prizes -1.424 0.048 0.048 -0.952 -2.897* -2.522*
(0.84) (1.04) (1.39) (1.02) (1.31) (1.16) 
3 Prizes 0.426 0.855 0.855 0.241 -0.003 0.778 
(0.75) (0.92) (1.08) (1.04) (1.16) (1.19) 
Stranger*8 Prizes -2.945
(1.67) 
Stranger*3 Prizes -0.858
(1.48) 
Lag of Own Bid 0.271** 0.461** 
(0.04) (0.05) 
Lag of Win  indicator -0.319 -0.370
(0.42) (0.47) 
Lag of Counterpart’s Bid 0.176** 0.026 
(0.03) (0.02) 
Lag of Own Bid*8 Prizes 0.101 0.125 
(0.06) (0.09) 
Lag of Own Bid*3 Prizes 0.021 -0.060
(0.09) (0.07) 
Period 0.047 0.074* 
(0.05) (0.03) 
Risk-seeking 0.079 0.378 
(0.50) (0.53) 
Constant 9.940** 9.123** 9.123** 4.887** 11.387** 6.067** 
(0.61) (1.48) (0.78) (0.95) (1.00) (0.97) 
Observations 17,280 17,280 8,640 8,064 8,640 8,064 
Number of Subjects 216 216 108 108 108 108 
R-sq 0.009 0.015 0.001 0.170 0.027 0.300 
Where * and ** indicate significance at 5% and 1% levels. I use OLS regressions. Standard errors, provided in parentheses, are 
clustered at individual level for Model 1, 2, 5 and 6, and at both individual level and group level for Model 3 and 4. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
This section investigates individual behavior in the non-constant-sum Colonel 
Blotto Game, where both leftover endowments and prizes are valuable for subjects. I ran 
this experiment using both repeated matching protocol and random matching protocol. I 
also vary the number of prizes. I find that most bids fall within the predicted boundaries 
provided by Roberson and Kvasov (2012). However, our data shows under the repeated 
matching protocol, subjects significantly underbid compared to theoretical expected 
equilibrium, which also contradicts previous experimental studies exhibiting individual 
overdissipation in either single-prize or multiple-prize all-pay auction contests. I suggest 
that bidder collusion explains this underbidding phenomenon. 
I also compare and contrast two different matching protocols. I find that there is 
no significant difference in terms of the quantitative level and distribution of bids 
between repeated matching protocol and random matching protocol. However, the 
effects of decision-making strategies and demographic information are diverse under 
different matching protocols. I find that people bear both their own and their 
counterparts’ previous strategies in mind when they make decisions in the repeated 
matching treatment. However, people rely only on their own previous strategies in the 
random matching treatment.  
Varying the number of prizes has no effect on subjects’ underbidding strategies 
under repeated matching protocol. However, subjects only underbid when they face a 
large number prizes, not when they face a small number of prizes. Instead, they just bid 
around the expected Nash Equilibrium.   
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5. SUMMARY 
 
The experimental approach has been well recognized as an effective and efficient 
tool that provides us with better understanding when studying public policy. The three 
experiments that compromise this dissertation take different areas of public policy in 
account: health policy, social policy and economic policy. Experiments are carefully 
designed to capture the features of the real world. To examine the effects of different 
policies, changes in subjects’ behavior are observed and analyzed as incentives or the 
institutions change.  
For health policy, I investigate the extent to which two incentive treatments, a 
waiver of blood transfusion fees and priority access to blood supplies, are effective in 
increasing donations. I find that contributions increase the most when subjects are 
exposed to a combination of waiver and priority incentives. Both the waiver treatment 
and the priority treatment individually increase contributions; the waiver treatment, 
however, is more successful at increasing donations than the priority treatment.  
To study social welfare, a public goods game is adopted to explore how group 
size influences the effectiveness of a punishment institution. In this experiment, there are 
three varying group sizes: 2, 8 and 24. Subjects play a standard public goods game 
without punishment for the first 10 periods followed by another 10 periods of a public 
goods game with a punishment institution that allows subjects to punish others group 
members. Results show that in groups of 2, the punishment institution has no effect on 
contribution levels. When the group size increases, however, the provision of public 
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goods is raised dramatically by the introduction of punishment, and cooperation is 
sustained until the last round.  
Economic policy is simulated in the non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game, in 
which two players simultaneously allocate their endowments across several prizes. This 
game mimics the investment decisions of companies which compete in markets. Each 
player’s objective is to maximize earnings by using a minimum amount of resources to 
win more prizes. The prize goes to the person who has allocated a larger amount to the 
prize. The experiment is conducted using both a repeated matching protocol and a 
random matching protocol. Under each matching protocol, I run different treatments 
varying the number of prizes. Experimental results show that although subjects use 
different strategies to make decisions for different matching protocols, there is no 
significant difference between the two matching protocols. Participants under the partner 
matching protocol always bid less than the theoretical Nash Equilibrium. Participants 
under the stranger matching protocol underbid, but only when they face a large number 
of prizes. Under repeated interaction, tacit collusion is relatively easy, but with random 
interaction, having fewer prizes makes the market more competitive and thus makes tacit 
collusion more difficult. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE BLOOD DONATION GAME 
A.1 Instructions
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. Your earnings will depend 
on the decisions that you make, the decisions of other people, and chance. You will be 
paid these earnings privately in cash at the end of the session today. However, during the 
experiment, we shall not speak of “dollars” but rather of “tokens”. At the end of the 
experiment, the total amount of tokens will be converted to dollars at the following rate: 
40 tokens = 1 dollar 
This experiment consists of two games, Game One and Game Two. Each game 
includes six periods. At the beginning of each game, you will be randomly assigned into 
a six-person group. Your group composition will remain the same for the entirety of the 
game (six periods). Each game begins with each subject having a private account, which 
contains thirty tokens and two units, and each group having an empty group account. At 
the end of the session today, one of the two games will be randomly selected for 
payment. The experimenter will roll a die to select the random round. 
Game One (Baseline Treatment) 
What to do: In each period there are three phases that will involve decision-
making.  In the first phase, you will decide (if you are eligible, as explained later) 
whether to donate to the group account.  In the second phase, you will play a lottery 
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game, which determines whether you are a “winner” or a “loser”. In the third phase, if 
you are a loser, you will have a chance to purchase one unit from the group account as 
explained later. Your earnings depend on how many units you hold at the end of the 
period. We will now go over the details for each phase.    
Donating to the group account (Phase 1): If you have enough units in your 
private account at the beginning of a period, you are eligible to donate a unit to the group 
account. At the beginning of each period, if you have two units in your private account, 
you will be asked to make the choice either to keep both units or to donate one unit from 
your private account to the group account. If you have fewer than two units, you are not 
eligible to donate. Later, donated units in group account will be distributed among your 
group members who lost in the lottery game (see next page). However, you will not 
know if you are a winner or loser before you make your decision. 
Playing the lottery game (Phase 2): In the lottery game, you choose one integer 
from 1 through 6. Then the computer will randomly generate three lucky numbers, also 
from 1 through 6. If the number you choose is one of the lucky numbers, you win, and 
you are able to retain all the remaining units in your private account. If the number you 
choose is not one of the lucky numbers, you lose, and all the remaining units will be 
deducted from your private account. In other words, a loser in the lottery game will have 
zero units in the private account. However, losers might be able to purchase units from 
the group account. 
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Example 1: Suppose you chose number 4 and there are two units in your private 
account. If the computer generates number 1, 2 and 4 as lucky numbers, you are a 
winner and you can keep everything in your private account. 
Example 2: Suppose you chose number 5 and there is one unit in your private 
account. If the computer generates number 1, 2 and 6 as the lucky numbers, you are a 
loser and you lose the unit in your private account. Therefore, you have zero units in 
your private account. (Note that if you are a loser, you will lose all units in your private 
account.) 
Purchasing from the group account (Phase 3): If you are a loser, you will have a 
chance to purchase one unit from the group account and deposit it to your private 
account. If the total number of units requested by losers exceeds the number of units in 
the group account, units in the group account will be allocated randomly among those 
requesting units. Each unit purchased costs a fee of thirty tokens. (Remember, only those 
who successfully purchase units will pay the fee.) Winners do not have the opportunity 
to purchase units from the group account. 
Example 1: Suppose there are two losers in your group, and both losers requested 
to purchase one unit. Suppose there are currently two donated units in the group account. 
Then each loser will successfully make the purchase, receiving one unit and paying 
thirty tokens. 
Example 2: Suppose there are three losers in your group, and all of them 
requested to purchase one unit. However, there are just two donated units in the group 
account. Then these two units will be randomly assigned to two of the three losers 
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respectively. Each loser will have an equal chance (2/3) of getting one unit from the 
group account. Each of the two losers who successfully makes the purchase pays thirty 
tokens. The loser who does not make the purchase does not need to pay.  
Receiving payoffs: Note that units are valuable for you. After losers purchase 
units, you can earn tokens from units that you are currently holding in your private 
account. Numbers of units and their corresponding payoffs are shown in the table below.  
You will receive payoffs in tokens from the units currently retained in your 
private account. Your earnings are cumulative. Both earning tokens and units carry over 
to the next period. (However, units in the group account do not carry over.) 
Getting bonus units: Before the beginning of the next period, if the number of 
units in your private account at the end of a period is fewer than two, one bonus unit will 
be automatically added to your account. The maximum number of units you can hold is 
two, so if you already have two units in your current private account, you will not 
receive the bonus unit. 
Example 1: If you lost in the lottery game and did not get to purchase a unit from 
the group account, you would have zero units at the end of that period. You will receive 
one bonus unit prior to the start of the next period.  
Number of Units 2 1 0 
Token-payoffs 125 100 0 
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Example 2: If you won in the lottery game and did not donate a unit to the group 
account, you have two units in your private account. You will not be able to receive one 
bonus unit. You will still have two units to begin next period. 
Game Two (Waiver Treatment) 
Compared to Game One, the only difference in Game Two is that each unit 
successfully purchased is free for lottery losers who were donors, while it costs thirty 
tokens for lottery losers who were not donors.  
Example 1: Suppose there are two losers in your group. One of the loser donated 
one unit to the group account in Phase 1, but the other one did not. Both losers requested 
to purchase one unit. Suppose there are currently two donated units in the group account. 
Then both losers will successfully make the purchase. However, the loser who was not a 
donor pays thirty tokens for receiving the unit, while the loser who was a donor receives 
the unit for free. (Remember that if the total number of units requested by losers exceeds 
the number of units in the group account, units in the group account will be allocated 
randomly among those requesting units.) 
Game Two (Priority Treatment) 
Compared to Game One, the only difference in Game Two is that losers who 
were donors are guaranteed to make purchases if they make requests. The remaining 
units in the group account will be randomly allocated among requests submitted by 
losers who were not donors. 
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Example 1: Suppose there are three losers in your group. One of them donated 
one unit to the group account, but the other two did not. All the three losers requested to 
purchase one unit. However, suppose there are just two donated units in the group 
account. First, the loser who was a donor will be guaranteed to receive one unit form the 
group account. Then the remaining one unit will be randomly assigned to one of the 
other two losers who were not donors. Each loser will have an equal chance (1/2) of 
getting one unit from the group account. Each of the two losers who successfully makes 
the purchase pays thirty tokens. The loser who does not make the purchase does not need 
to pay. 
Game Two (Waiver & Priority Treatment) 
Compare to Game One, there are two differences in Game Two: 
1. Losers who were donors are guaranteed to make purchases if they make
requests, then the remaining units in the group account will be randomly allocated 
among requests submitted by losers who were not donors;  
2. Each unit successfully purchased is free for lottery losers who were
donors, while it costs thirty tokens for lottery losers who were not donors. 
Example 1: Suppose there are three losers in your group. One of them donated 
one unit to the group account in Phase 1, but the other two did not. All of them requested 
to purchase one unit. However, suppose there are just two donated units in the group 
account. First, the loser who was a donor will get one unit for free. Then the remaining 
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one unit in the group account will be randomly assigned to one of the other two losers 
who were not donors. In other words, each loser who was not donor will have an equal 
chance (1/2) of getting one unit from the group account. The unit received by the loser 
who was not a donor costs thirty tokens. 
A.2 Mixed Strategy for the Priority Treatment
p ∗ (0.5 ∗ 100 + 0.5 ∗ 70) = (1 − p)(0.5 ∗ 125 + 0.5 ∗ ((1 − 𝑝)5 ∗ 0 + 𝐶1
5 ∗ p ∗
(1 − 𝑝)4 ∗ (𝐶5
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ 70 + 𝐶4
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ (
1
2
) ∗ 70 + 𝐶3
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ (
1
3
) ∗ 70 + 𝐶2
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗
(
1
4
) ∗ 70 + 𝐶1
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ (
1
5
) ∗ 70 + 𝐶0
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ (
1
6
) ∗ 70) + 𝐶2
5 ∗ 𝑝2 ∗ (1 − 𝑝)3 ∗
(𝐶5
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ 70 + 𝐶4
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ 70 + 𝐶3
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ (
2
3
) ∗ 70 + 𝐶2
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ (
2
4
) ∗ 70 + 𝐶1
5 ∗
0.55 ∗ (
2
5
) ∗ 70 + 𝐶0
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ (
2
6
) ∗ 70) + 𝐶3
5 ∗ 𝑝3 ∗ (1 − 𝑝)2 ∗ (𝐶5
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ 70 + 𝐶4
5 ∗
0.55 ∗ 70 + 𝐶3
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ 70 + 𝐶2
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ (
3
4
) ∗ 70 + 𝐶1
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ (
3
5
) ∗ 70 + 𝐶0
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗
(
3
6
) ∗ 70) + 𝐶4
5 ∗ 𝑝4 ∗ (1 − 𝑝)1 ∗ (𝐶5
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ 70 + 𝐶4
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ 70 + 𝐶3
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ 70 +
𝐶2
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ 70 + 𝐶1
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ (
4
5
) ∗ 70 + 𝐶0
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ (
4
6
) ∗ 70) + 𝐶5
5 ∗ 𝑝5 ∗
(𝐶5
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ 70 + 𝐶4
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ 70 + 𝐶3
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ 70 + 𝐶2
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ 70 + 𝐶1
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ 70 +
𝐶0
5 ∗ 0.55 ∗ (
5
6
) ∗ 70))) , 
where 𝑝 denotes the equilibrium probability of donating. 
The solution for 𝑝 is 0.51. 
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APPENDIX B 
THE PUBLIC GOODS GAME 
B.1 Sample Instructions (Group Size of 8)
Phase I Instructions 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. If you read the following 
instructions carefully, you can, depending on your decisions, earn a considerable amount 
of money. It is therefore very important that you read these instructions with care. 
The instructions which have been distributed to you are solely for your private 
information. It is prohibited to communicate with the other participants during the 
experiment. If you have any questions please ask us. If you violate this rule, we shall 
have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments. 
During the experiment we shall not speak of Dollars but rather of tokens. During 
the experiment your earnings will be calculated in tokens. At the end of the experiment 
the total amount of tokens would have earned will be converted to Dollars at the 
following rate: 
40 tokens = 1 dollar 
At the end of the experiment your entire earnings from the experiment plus the 5 
Dollar show-up fee will be immediately paid to you in cash. 
The experiment is divided into two phases, and the first phase consists of 10 
periods. Before the first period, the participants are matched into groups of 8. You will 
therefore be in a group with 7 other participants. The composition of the groups will 
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remain the same for the 10 periods. In each period your group will therefore consist of 
same participants. 
In each period the experiment consists of one decision. At this stage you have to 
decide how many tokens you would like to contribute to a project. The following pages 
describe the course of the experiment in detail. 
Detailed Information on the Experiment 
The First Stage 
At the beginning of each period each participant receives 20 tokens. In the 
following we call this his or her endowment. Your task is to decide how to use your 
endowment. You have to decide how many of the 20 tokens you want to contribute to a 
project and how many of them to keep for yourself. The consequences of your decision 
are explained in detail below. 
At the beginning of each period the following input screen for the first stage will 
appear: 
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The number of periods appears in the top left corner of the screen. In the top right 
corner you can see how many more seconds remain for you to decide on the distribution 
of your tokens. Your decision must be made before the time displayed is 0 seconds.  
 You have to decide how many tokens you want to contribute to the project by 
typing a number between 0 and 20 in the input field. This field can be reached by 
clicking it with the mouse. As soon as you have decided how many tokens to contribute 
to the project, you have also decided how many tokens to keep for yourself. This is (20 – 
your contribution) tokens. After entering your contribution you must press the OK 
button with the mouse. Once you have done this your decision can no longer be revised.  
After all members of your group have made their decisions the following income 
screen will show you the total amount of tokens contributed by all eight group members 
to the project (including your contribution). Also this screen shows you how many 
tokens you have earned in the first stage. 
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The Income Screen after the First Stage 
Your income consists of two parts: 
1) The tokens which you have kept for yourself (“Income from tokens kept”)
2) The “Income from the project.” This income is calculated as follows:
Your income from the project = 0.25 x total contribution of all 8 group members
to the project 
Your income in tokens at the first stage of a period is therefore: 
(20 – Your contribution to the project) + 0.25*(total contributions to the project) 
The income of each group member from the project is calculated in the same 
way, this means that each group member receives the same income from the project. 
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Suppose the sum of the contributions of all group members is 60 tokens. In this case 
each member of the group receives an income from the project of: 0.25*60 = 15 tokens. 
Now suppose that total contribution to the project is 9 tokens, then each member of the 
group receives an income of 0.25*9 = 2.25 tokens from the project. 
For each token that you keep for yourself you earn an income of 1 token. 
Supposing you contributed this token to the project instead, then the total contribution to 
the project would rise by one token. Your income from the project would rise by 0.25*1 
= 0.25 tokens. However, the income of the other group members would also rise by 0.25 
tokens each, so that the total income of the group from the project would rise by 2 
tokens. Your contribution to the project therefore also raises the income of the other 
group members. On the other hand you earn an income for each token contributed by the 
other members of the project. For each token contributed by any member you earn 
0.25*1 = 0.25 tokens. 
In every period you have 10 seconds to review the income screen. If you are 
finished with it before the time is up, please press the continue button (again by using the 
mouse).  
Phase II Instructions 
We will now repeat this experiment with one change. As before, the experiment 
consists of 10 periods and in each period you have to make a decision how many of the 
20 tokens at your disposal you want to contribute to the project (and, implicitly, how 
many you keep for yourself) 
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The Change 
The second stage is added. In the following ten periods there will be a 2nd stage 
following the 1st stage.  At the 2nd stage you are informed of the contribution of the other 
group member to the project. You can then decide whether or how much to reduce their 
earnings from the first stage by distributing deduction points to them. The instruction for 
the 2nd stage is as below: 
The Second Stage 
In the second stage you see how much the other group members contributed to 
the project. At this stage you can also reduce or leave equal the income of each group 
member by distributing deduction points. The other group members can also reduce 
your income if they wish to. This is apparent from the input screen at the second stage: 
The Input Screen at the 2nd Stage 
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Besides the period and time display, you see here on the left how much each 
group member contributed to the project at the first stage.  
You must now decide how many points to give to each of the other 7 group 
members by entering a number in the box. If you do not wish to change the income of a 
group member then you must enter 0. For your decision, you have 35 seconds in all the 
periods. You can move from one input field to another by using the mouse. 
If you distribute points, you incur a cost which depends on the total amount of 
points you distribute. You can distribute between 0 and 3 total points to your group 
members. Note that the maximum total amount of deduction points that can be 
distributed is 3. The more points you give to the other group members, the higher your 
costs. Each deduction point you distribute to a group member costs you 1 token and 
deducts the group member’s earnings by 3 tokens.  
Suppose you distribute a total of 3 deduction points among some of the other 7 
members in your group. In this case, your costs of distributing points would be 3 tokens. 
Your total costs of distributing points are displayed on the input screen. As long as you 
have not pressed the OK button you can revise your decision. 
If you choose 0 points for a group member, you do not change his or her income. 
However, if you give a member 1 point (by choosing 1) you reduce his or her income 
from the first stage by 3 tokens. If you give a member 2 points (by choosing 2) you 
reduce his or her income by 6 tokens.  
Whether or by how much the income from the first stage is reduced depends on 
the total of the received points. If somebody received a total of 7 points (from all other 
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group members this period) his or her income would be reduced by 21 tokens.  Your 
total income from the two stages is calculated as follows and the minimum income is 0 
tokens. 
Total income (in tokens) at the end of the 2nd stage = period income = 
= income from the 1st stage – distributed deduction points*1– received deduction 
points*3 
Remember that the maximum total amount of deduction points that can be 
distributed to the other group members is 3 and your minimum period income is 0. 
After all participants have made their decisions, your income from the period will 
be displayed on the following screen: 
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The calculation of your income from a period, the costs of your distribution and 
your income in the period are as explained above. Do you have any further questions? 
After the end of these 10 periods, the experiment is finished and you will get: 
  Your income in tokens from the first set of 10 periods 
+Your income in tokens from the second set of 10 periods
= Total Income in tokens 
(Total Income in tokens)/40 + 5 Dollars show-up fee 
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APPENDIX C 
THE COLONEL BLOTTO GAME 
C.1 General Instructions
This is a study of economic decision making.  Your earnings in this study depend 
on the decisions that you make, the decisions of other people, and chance.  You will be 
paid these earnings privately in cash at the end of the session today. 
Please take a minute to turn off your cellphones.  There is no talking during the 
study except to ask questions.  If you have questions at any time, please raise your hand 
and someone will come and assist you.   
C.2 Instructions, Part 1
In this game, you choose one of the six possible options, as shown below.  Once 
you choose an option, the experimenter will pick up this sheet with your decision 
selected.  (another part of the experiment may follow this) Then the experimenter will 
grab a paper bag with 12 poker chips inside.  These poker chips are labeled with the 
integers 1 through 12, corresponding to your computer stations.  The experimenter will 
randomly and blindly select a chip.  The number on the chip the experimenter selects 
corresponds to the person responsible the picking the chosen participant.   Then by the 
same process, this person will then randomly and blindly select one of the 12 chips in the 
bag.   The number on the chip this person selects corresponds to the chosen participant. 
(Note that there is only one chosen participant and that the same person responsible for 
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picking the chosen participant can be the chosen participant as well)  Once the chosen 
participant is found, at the end of the session, a six-sided die will be rolled to determine 
whether the chosen participant receives payment A or payment B.  If a 1, 2, or 3 is rolled 
the chosen participant receives payment A; if a 4, 5, or 6 is rolled the chosen participant 
receives payment B.  You only play the game once.  
When this game is completed, you will be paid the amount you earn in this game.  
Note:  the dollar values in the each experiment are measured in US dollars. 
Option Payment A Payment B 
1 $12.00 $12.00 
2 $8.00 $20.00 
3 $4.00 $28.00 
4 $0.00 $36.00 
5 -$4.00 $44.00 
6 -$8.00 $48.00 
Examples:  
If you choose option 1:  If you roll 1, 2, or 3 you earn $12.00; if you roll 4, 5, or 
6, you earn $12.00. 
If you choose option 2:  If you roll 1, 2, or 3 you earn $8.00; if you roll 4, 5, or 6, 
you earn $20.00. 
If you choose option 3:  If you roll 1, 2, or 3 you earn $4.00; if you roll 4, 5, or 6, 
you earn $28.00. 
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If you choose option 4:  If you roll 1, 2, or 3 you earn $0.00; if you roll 4, 5, or 6, 
you earn $36.00. 
If you choose option 5:  If you roll 1, 2, or 3 you lose $4.00; if you roll 4, 5, or 6, 
you earn $44.00. 
If you choose option 6:  If you roll 1, 2, or 3 you lose $8.00; if you roll 4, 5, or 6, 
you earn $48.00. 
Decision: 
When you are ready please circle the option you prefer.  Remember, there are no 
right or wrong answers, you should just choose the option that you like best. 
C.3 Sample Instructions, Part 2 (8 Prizes, Repeated Matching Protocol)
For Part 2, earnings are described in tokens and at the end of the session the 
tokens will be added and translated into dollars at a rate of 200 tokens = 1 US dollar.   
In this session, there are two types of people.  Half of the people in the room will 
be assigned to the “Participant 1” type and the other half will be assigned to the 
“Participant 2” type.  You will be randomly matched with another person in this room 
from the other type (called your “counterpart”) and both of you will each make a series 
of decisions. You will not know who your counterpart is, and they will not know who 
you are.  You will keep your type designation for the entirety of this session.  Also, you 
and your counterpart will be matched for the entirety of this session.  Your earnings for 
each decision will depend on the decisions that you make and the decisions that your 
counterpart makes.   
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Today, you and your counterpart will be facing multiple “boxes”.  You have 
resources to spend to win these boxes.  However, these resources are also valuable to 
you.  In every period you and your counterpart will choose an action at the same time.  
You will not know what your counterpart has chosen before you make your own choice, 
and they will not know your choice before they make theirs.  After both of you have 
chosen, you will find out what your counterpart did and the resulting earnings for you 
both.   
If you have more resources in a given box than your counterpart, you will win 
the box.  Each box won will have an earnings benefit.  If you have fewer resources than 
your counterpart in a box, you will lose the box.  If you and your counterpart have the 
same number of resources in a box, then you and your counterpart will have a 50% 
chance of winning the box. 
Today, you and your counterpart will play 15 periods.  For each period, you will 
have 200 tokens as resources to allocate across 8 different boxes.  Your counterpart will 
also have 200 tokens to allocate across these boxes.  Each box is worth 25 tokens to the 
winner and 0 tokens to the loser.  For each period, you can allocate your resources in any 
amount in any number and combination of boxes you wish.  Note that you do not have to 
spend your entire allotment of 200 tokens nor do you have to spend tokens in all boxes 
(some may be left empty). Resources that you do not spend in boxes count toward your 
earnings later.  
In a given period, once you finish distributing your tokens to the 8 boxes, you 
will see the results of the number of boxes won/lost and your earnings for that period.  
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Once this is finished, you will move to the next period where the process starts over 
again with 200 tokens to distribute and 8 boxes.  Earnings per period are cumulative and 
will be paid, in private, at the end of the session.  Next are two examples to help explain 
the game. 
Example 1:  
Suppose you are Participant 1 and have allocated all of your 200 tokens across 
the following eight different boxes:  (note, that the first column indicates the 1st box, the 
2nd column indicates the 2nd box, and so on up to 8 total boxes) 
Next you will see what Participant 2 allocated across these boxes. (Remember, 
these decisions are simultaneous, you will not see the choices of the other participant 
until you have already made your choices per period and vice versa) 
Participant 2 spent 80 of the 200 tokens on these 8 boxes.  The middle row 
indicates which boxes you (as Participant 1) won. 
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You won 6 boxes and lost 2.  Next we detail your and your counterpart’s 
earnings for this period. 
You earned 150 tokens and your counterpart earned 170 tokens from this period. 
Example 2: 
Suppose you are Participant 2 and have allocated 160 of your 200 tokens across 
the following eight different boxes:  
Initial resource endowment Initial resource endowment
minus minus
Total tokens spent Total tokens spent
plus plus
Box winnings Box winnings
(6 boxes x 25 tokens per box) (2 boxes x 25 tokens per box)
Period earnings Period earnings 
PARTICIPANT 1 PERIOD EARNINGS PARTICIPANT 2 PERIOD EARNINGS
150 tokens 170 tokens
200 tokens 200 tokens
200 tokens 80 tokens
150 tokens 50 tokens
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Next you will see what Participant 1 allocated across these boxes. (remember, 
these decisions are simultaneous, you will not see the choices of the other participant 
until you have already made your choices per period and vice versa) 
Participant 1 spent 80 of the 200 tokens on these 8 boxes. The middle row 
indicates which boxes you (as Participant 2) won.   
You won 6 boxes and lost 2.  Note that you and your counterpart had the same 
number of tokens in boxes 1, 2, and 5.  For these boxes, the computer randomly awarded 
box 2 to you and boxes 1 and 5 to your counterpart.   Next we detail your and your 
counterpart’s period earnings. 
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You earned 190 tokens and your counterpart earned 170 tokens from this period.  
Once everyone has finished reading these instructions, please wait for the 
experimenter to reread them to you.  After the experimenter has finished, you will be 
assigned your type and the session will start.  
C.4 Sample Instructions, Part 2 (8 Prizes, Random Matching Protocol)
For Part 2, earnings are described in tokens and at the end of the session the 
tokens will be added and translated into dollars at a rate of 200 tokens = 1 US dollar.   
In this session, there are two types of people.  Half of the people in the room will 
be assigned to the “Participant 1” type and the other half will be assigned to the 
“Participant 2” type.  You will be randomly matched with another person in this room 
from the other type (called your “counterpart”) and both of you will each make a series 
of decisions. You will not know who your counterpart is, and they will not know who 
you are.  You will keep your type designation for the entirety of this session.  Also, you 
and your counterpart will be a different person from the preceding period.  Your 
Initial resource endowment Initial resource endowment
minus minus
Total tokens spent Total tokens spent
plus plus
Box winnings Box winnings
(2 boxes x 25 tokens per box) (6 boxes x 25 tokens per box)
Period earnings Period earnings 
PARTICIPANT 1 PERIOD EARNINGS PARTICIPANT 2 PERIOD EARNINGS
170 tokens 190 tokens
50 tokens 150 tokens
80 tokens 160 tokens
200 tokens 200 tokens
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earnings for each decision will depend on the decisions that you make and the decisions 
that your counterpart makes.   
Today, you and your counterpart will be facing multiple “boxes”.  You have 
resources to spend to win these boxes.  However, these resources are also valuable to 
you.  In every period you and your counterpart will choose an action at the same time.  
You will not know what your counterpart has chosen before you make your own choice, 
and they will not know your choice before they make theirs.  After both of you have 
chosen, you will find out what your counterpart did and the resulting earnings for you 
both.   
If you have more resources in a given box than your counterpart, you will win 
the box.  Each box won will have an earnings benefit.  If you have fewer resources than 
your counterpart in a box, you will lose the box.  If you and your counterpart have the 
same number of resources in a box, then you and your counterpart will have a 50% 
chance of winning the box. 
Today, you and your counterpart will play 15 periods.  For each period, you will 
have 200 tokens as resources to allocate across 8 different boxes.  Your counterpart will 
also have 200 tokens to allocate across these boxes.  Each box is worth 25 tokens to the 
winner and 0 tokens to the loser.  For each period, you can allocate your resources in any 
amount in any number and combination of boxes you wish.  Note that you do not have to 
spend your entire allotment of 200 tokens nor do you have to spend tokens in all boxes 
(some may be left empty). Resources that you do not spend in boxes count toward your 
earnings later.  
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In a given period, once you finish distributing your tokens to the 8 boxes, you 
will see the results of the number of boxes won/lost and your earnings for that period.  
Once this is finished, you will move to the next period where the process starts over 
again with 200 tokens to distribute and 8 boxes.  Earnings per period are cumulative and 
will be paid, in private, at the end of the session.  Next are two examples to help explain 
the game. 
Example 1:  
Suppose you are Participant 1 and have allocated all of your 200 tokens across 
the following eight different boxes:  (note, that the first column indicates the 1st box, the 
2nd column indicates the 2nd box, and so on up to 8 total boxes) 
Next you will see what Participant 2 allocated across these boxes. (Remember, 
these decisions are simultaneous, you will not see the choices of the other participant 
until you have already made your choices per period and vice versa) 
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Participant 2 spent 80 of the 200 tokens on these 8 boxes.  The middle row 
indicates which boxes you (as Participant 1) won.   
You won 6 boxes and lost 2.  Next we detail your and your counterpart’s 
earnings for this period. 
You earned 150 tokens and your counterpart earned 170 tokens from this period. 
Example 2: 
Suppose you are Participant 2 and have allocated 160 of your 200 tokens across 
the following eight different boxes:  
Initial resource endowment Initial resource endowment
minus minus
Total tokens spent Total tokens spent
plus plus
Box winnings Box winnings
(6 boxes x 25 tokens per box) (2 boxes x 25 tokens per box)
Period earnings Period earnings 
PARTICIPANT 1 PERIOD EARNINGS PARTICIPANT 2 PERIOD EARNINGS
150 tokens 170 tokens
200 tokens 200 tokens
200 tokens 80 tokens
150 tokens 50 tokens
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Next you will see what Participant 1 allocated across these boxes. (remember, 
these decisions are simultaneous, you will not see the choices of the other participant 
until you have already made your choices per period and vice versa) 
Participant 1 spent 80 of the 200 tokens on these 8 boxes. The middle row 
indicates which boxes you (as Participant 2) won.   
You won 6 boxes and lost 2.  Note that you and your counterpart had the same 
number of tokens in boxes 1, 2, and 5.  For these boxes, the computer randomly awarded 
box 2 to you and boxes 1 and 5 to your counterpart.   Next we detail your and your 
counterpart’s period earnings. 
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You earned 190 tokens and your counterpart earned 170 tokens from this period.  
Once everyone has finished reading these instructions, please wait for the 
experimenter to reread them to you.  After the experimenter has finished, you will be 
assigned your type and the session will start.  
Initial resource endowment Initial resource endowment
minus minus
Total tokens spent Total tokens spent
plus plus
Box winnings Box winnings
(2 boxes x 25 tokens per box) (6 boxes x 25 tokens per box)
Period earnings Period earnings 
PARTICIPANT 1 PERIOD EARNINGS PARTICIPANT 2 PERIOD EARNINGS
170 tokens 190 tokens
50 tokens 150 tokens
80 tokens 160 tokens
200 tokens 200 tokens
